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I.  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
A.  America the Vulnerable 
As Jonathan Raban wrote in a 2005 essay in the New York 
Review of Books: 
In its present form, the [American] War on Terror is a 
crippling, expensive, meagerly productive effort to locate, 
catch, and kill bad guys around the globe.  Its successes 
are hardly less random, or more effective in the long-term, 
than those that might be achieved by a platoon of men 
armed with flyswatters entering a slaughterhouse whose 
refrigeration has been off for a week.1
Sobering facts support Raban’s flyswatters-in-a-
 1. Jonathan Raban, The Truth About Terrorism, N.Y. REV. BKS. 22, 25 
(Jan. 13, 2005). 
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slaughterhouse metaphor.  Stephen Flynn, a former Coast Guard 
commander and director of global issues on the National Security 
Council staff under President Bill Clinton, has written an entire 
book, published in 2004, on the subject: America the Vulnerable: 
How Our Government is Failing to Protect Us From Terrorism.2  
Flynn argues that “[p]aradoxically, the United States has no rival 
when it comes to projecting its military, economic, and cultural 
power around the world,” yet “we are practically defenseless at 
home.”3  In sobering tones—linking our national unpreparedness 
for 9/11 to our homeland security at present—Flynn summarizes 
our current state of national vulnerability to terrorism in an 
extract worthy of complete quotation: 
If September 11, 2001, was a wake-up call, clearly 
America has fallen back asleep. Our return to 
complacency could not be more foolhardy.  The 9/11 
attacks were not an aberration.  The same forces that 
helped to produce the horror that befell the nation on that 
day continue to gather strength.  Yet we appear to be 
unwilling to do what must be done to make our society 
less of a target.  Instead, we are sailing into a national 
security version of the Perfect Storm. 
Homeland security has entered our post-9/11 lexicon, but 
homeland insecurity remains the abiding reality.  With 
the exception of airports, much of what is critical to our 
way of life remains unprotected. 
* * * 
From water and food supplies; refineries, energy grids, 
and pipelines; bridges, tunnels, trains, trucks and cargo 
containers; to the cyber backbone that underpins the 
information age in which we live, the measures we have 
been cobbling together are hardly fit to deter amateur 
thieves, vandals, and hackers, never mind determined 
terrorists.  Worse still, small improvements are often 
oversold as giant steps forward, lowering the guard of 
 2. See generally STEPHEN FLYNN, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE: HOW OUR 
GOVERNMENT IS FAILING TO PROTECT US FROM TERRORISM (2004). 
 3. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
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average citizens as they carry on their daily routine with 
an unwarranted sense of confidence.4
In the American constitutional system, of course, matters of 
foreign policy and national security are delegated by the People 
principally to the president and executive agencies under his 
purview (e.g., the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the armed forces of the United 
States).5  Congress, however, has from the founding days of the 
Republic exercised “[a]ll legislative powers”—and related specific 
powers—forming a tradition of vigorous oversight of executive 
branch activities, in general, and of foreign policy oversight and 
national security policy oversight, in particular.6  Yet, how has 
Congress performed its oversight responsibilities in the wake of 
9/11?  And, how is it equipped to handle oversight of national 
counterterrorism policy and its implementation in the remainder 
 4. Id. at 1-2.  See also AMITAI ETZIONI, FROM EMPIRE TO COMMUNITY 118-
20 (2004) (comparing “small-scale terrorism” with the “massive terrorism” 
risks of attacks on domestic populations with weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), opining that “[t]he difference between small-scale and massive 
terrorism is as significant as the difference between a crime wave and 
genocide,” providing the horrific hypothetical of al Qaeda “[getting] its hands 
on a nuclear device” that could conceivably “obliterate Manhattan, 
Washington, D.C., or Tel Aviv”). 
 5. The principal Constitutional provisions which support presidential 
power over foreign policy and national security are: U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 
1 (“The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America”), § 1, cl. 8 (prescribing a presidential oath to “preserve, protect, and 
defend the Constitution of the United States”), § 2, cl. 1 (the “President shall 
be commander in chief of the armed forces”), and § 2, cl. 2 (presidential 
power, with advice and consent of the Senate to “make treaties”). 
 6. The principal constitutional provisions which support the 
congressional power of oversight over the executive branch are: U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 1 (“[a]ll legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States”), § 7, cl. 2 (passage of bills), § 8, cl. 1 (taxing 
power), § 8, cl. 2 (borrowing power), § 8, cl. 3 (regulation of foreign and 
interstate commerce), § 8, cl. 4 (naturalization power), § 8, cl. 5 (coinage and 
regulation of foreign coin value powers), § 8, cl. 10 (powers to punish piracies 
and “felonies committed on the high seas”), § 8, cl. 11 (power to “declare war” 
and related powers), § 8, cl. 12 (power to “raise and support armies”), § 8, cl. 
13 (power to “provide and maintain a navy”), § 8, cl. 14 (power to “make rules 
for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces”), § 8, cl. 15 
(powers to “provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the 
union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions”), § 8, cl. 16 (powers to 
organize army and discipline militia), and § 8, cl. 18 (“necessary and proper” 
power to make laws). 
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of the first decade of the twenty-first century?  Trying to provide 
some tentative answers to the two aforementioned questions will 
be the overarching purposes of this Article. 
B.  Congressional Oversight of 9/11 and its Failure 
Just when the Nation needed adroit and resolute oversight of 
the causes and meaning of 9/11, the United States Congress 
botched the job.  Although Congress went through the motions of 
overseeing how and why the executive branch—through such 
agencies as the CIA and FBI—neglected to anticipate and prevent 
the Attack on America on September 11, 2001, for reasons which I 
seek to explain in this Article, the congressional exercise was a 
charade, and the publication of its two-and-one-half inch thick, 
royal blue-covered report, entitled Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence 
Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of 
September 11, 2001 (hereinafter Joint Inquiry Report or JIR),7 was 
a dismal failure. 
As I will demonstrate, the 9/11 oversight failure of Congress 
was due to a deficiency of institutional competence in matching 
and reining in the executive branch’s effort to stonewall and 
obfuscate.  While Congress tried to save face for its oversight 
failure by acquiescing to the creation of the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the “9/11 
Commission”),8 this maneuver was not constitutionally 
contemplated congressional oversight but congressional abdication 
to executive branch manipulation.  The central thesis of my 
Article, then, is that Congress must resuscitate its institutional 
competence for overseeing American counterterrorism policy and 
its implementation.  As I will explain, Congress can accomplish 
renewed competence for oversight of national counterterrorism 
through three specific actions: (1) consolidating intelligence 
 7. U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE & U.S. HOUSE 
PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT ON JOINT INQUIRY INTO 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST 
ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, S. REP. NO. 107-351, H.R. REP. NO. 107-792 
(2002) [hereinafter JOINT INQUIRY REPORT]. 
 8. See Intelligence Authorization for the Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 
107-306, 116 Stat. 2383 (2002).  The 9/11 Commission ultimately prepared a 
report.  See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED 
STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004). 
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functions, (2) fostering intelligence expertise among its members, 
and (3) experimenting with more decentralized and indirect forms 
of intervention with executive branch counterterrorism agencies.  
Yet, since what is past is prologue to purposeful reform, a 
substantial part of my Article is devoted to unpacking and 
analyzing what Congress did and did not do leading up to its 
issuance of the Joint Inquiry Report.  Indeed, the meaning of the 
Joint Inquiry Report can best be understood as a multi-flawed 
legal process.  Indeed, one of the purposes of this Article is to 
analyze the Joint Inquiry Report from three process perspectives: 
(1) the process of congressional oversight of executive intelligence 
gathering activities in order to interpret the meaning of the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11; (2) the attempt to interpret the process 
failures of America’s intelligence agencies leading up to 9/11; and 
(3) the attempt to recommend new government processes of 
national intelligence and security. 
The remainder of the Article is divided into five parts.  Part II 
describes the origins, purposes, and structure of the JIR—an 
undertaking by two permanent committees of Congress, one from 
the House of Representatives and one from the Senate.9  Part III 
discusses and interprets the findings and conclusions of the Joint 
Inquiry Report.10  Part IV examines the recommendations 
contained in the congressional document.11  Part V focuses on the 
additional views (in the nature of dissenting and concurring 
opinions) of members of the Joint Inquiry.12  Part VI discusses 
Congress’ constitutional responsibility for vigorous oversight of 
the executive branch, the lost art of congressional oversight, and 
some ideas for improving oversight of counterterrorism.13
II.  THE ORIGINS, PURPOSES, AND STRUCTURE OF THE JOINT INQUIRY 
A.  Origins and Purposes 
In the words of the Joint Inquiry Report, “[i]n February 2002 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House 
 9. See infra notes 14-55 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 56-122 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 123-77 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 178-251 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 252-304 and accompanying text. 
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Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence agreed to conduct a 
Joint Inquiry into the activities of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community in connection with the terrorist attacks perpetrated 
against our nation on September 11, 2001.”14  According to the 
JIR, “[r]eflecting the magnitude of the events of that day, the 
Committees’ decision was unprecedented in Congressional history: 
for the first time, two permanent committees, one from the House 
and one from the Senate, would join together to conduct a single, 
unified inquiry.”15  The three key purposes of the Joint Inquiry 
were to: (1) “conduct a factual review of what the Intelligence 
Community knew or should have known prior to September 11, 
2001, regarding the international terrorist threat to the United 
States, to include the scope and nature of any possible 
international terrorist attacks against the United States and its 
interests”;16  (2) “identify and examine any systematic problems 
that may have impeded the Intelligence Community in learning of 
or preventing these attacks in advance”;17 and (3) “make 
recommendations to improve the Intelligence Community’s ability 
to identify and prevent future international terrorist attacks.”18
The Joint Inquiry Report highlights the congressional 
oversight process which was pursued (in terms of documents 
considered, witnesses interrogated, and the like) to create a 
deceptive impression of thoroughness and completeness.  In this 
regard, the JIR states: 
 14. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.  While the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence has no subcommittees, the name of one of the four 
subcommittees of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence—
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security—reflects the post-9/11 
national security context.  See MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE 
ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2004 1799, 1806 (Charles Mahtesian ed., 
National Journal Group 2003).  Interestingly, the House now has a separate 
committee that did not participate in the Joint Inquiry called the Select 
Committee on Homeland Security, which has five subcommittees: 
Cybersecurity, Science, Research and Development; Emergency Preparedness 
& Response; Infrastructure & Border Security; Intelligence & 
Counterterrorism; and Rules.  Id. at 1807. 
 15. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.  There have been, however, 
joint committee undertakings in the past by both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate.  See infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 16. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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During the course of this Inquiry, these Committees have 
held nine public hearings as well as thirteen closed 
sessions in which classified information has been 
considered.  In addition, the Joint Inquiry Staff has 
reviewed almost 500,000 pages of relevant documents 
from the Intelligence Community agencies and other 
sources, of which about 100,000 pages have been selected 
for incorporation into the Joint Inquiry’s records.  The 
Staff also conducted approximately 300 interviews and 
has participated in numerous briefings and panel 
discussions, that have involved almost 600 individuals 
from the Intelligence Community agencies, other U.S. 
Government organizations, state and local entities, and 
representatives of the private sector and foreign 
governments.19
B.  The Structure of the Joint Inquiry Report 
The principal JIR consists of 435 pages (in addition to cover 
letters,20 a foreword,21 a summary table of contents,22 a detailed 
 19. Id. at 2. 
 20. Id. (following the title page).  Interestingly, the transmittal letter of 
Dec. 20, 2002 to Robert C.  Byrd, President Pro Tempore of the U.S. Senate, 
from Bob Graham, Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and 
Richard Shelby, Vice Chair, indicated that the “highly classified  and 
sensitive information” not included in the JIR would be available to “all 
members of the Senate” for readings in “secure facilities of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence.”  Id.  The House of Representatives transmittal 
letter was more restrictive.  The transmittal letter of Dec. 20, 2002 to J. 
Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House, from Porter Goss, chair, and Nancy 
Pelosi, ranking Democrat, while indicating that classified documents not 
included in the JIR would be held in “a Sensitive Compartmented 
Information Facility (SCIF),” made no mention in the transmitted letter to 
the Speaker of the House of reading access by other members of the House to 
the classified material.  Id. 
 21. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1 (following the Senate and 
House transmittal letters).  The foreword provides a three paragraph 
explanation for understanding additions and deletions to the original report 
(before classification review).  The foreword describes the process of JIR 
writing, classification, addition, and redaction as follows: 
This is the declassified version of the Final Report of the Joint 
Inquiry that was approved and filed with the House of 
Representatives and the Senate on December 20, 2002.  With the 
exception of portions that were released to the public previously 
(e.g., the additional views of Members, the GAO Anthrax Report, 
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etc.), this version has been declassified by the Intelligence 
Community prior to its public release.  That review was for 
classification purposes only and does not indicate Intelligence 
Community agreement with the accuracy of this report, or 
concurrence with its factual findings or conclusions. 
At appropriate points in the report, relevant information that 
developed after the report was filed, or that has appeared in other 
public sources, has been inserted and is denoted with an asterisk (*) 
and an accompanying footnote.  Where necessary, information that 
the Intelligence Community has identified as classified for national 
security purposes has been deleted.  Such deletions are indicated 
with brackets and a strikethrough [———————].  In other 
portions of the report, alternative language that the Intelligence 
Community has agreed is unclassified has been substituted for the 
original report language which remains classified.  Paragraphs that 
contain alternative language, whether one word or several 
sentences, have been identified by brackets at the beginning and end 
of the paragraph. 
As a result of these changes to the text, the page numbers at the 
bottom of each page do not match those of the original report.  In 
order to preserve a record of the original pagination, page numbers 
have been inserted in gray font [page xx] in the text to mark where 
the corresponding pages begin and end in the original report. 
Id.  From the process perspective of congressional oversight of executive 
intelligence gathering, one is reminded of the M.C. Escher print depicting a 
hand drawing another hand drawing the original hand.
 22. Id. at i.  This is the first page of the JIR that contains capital letters 
in gray font with a strikethrough, at both the top and bottom of the page, 
with the words “TOP SECRET.”  Every page of the JIR from i through 435 
bears the same “TOP SECRET” strikethrough markings.  See generally id.  
The summary table of contents reads as follows: 
Table of Contents 
Members of the Joint Inquiry 
Joint Inquiry Staff 
Abridged Findings and Conclusions 
Recommendations 
Final Report 
  Part One-The Joint Inquiry 
• The Context 
• Factual Findings 
• Conclusions-Factual Findings 
• Systemic Findings 
• Related Findings 
  Part Two-Narrative-The Attacks of September 11, 2001 
  Part Three-Topics-The Attacks of September 11, 2001 
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table of contents,23 committee membership and staff rosters,24 nine 
separate pages of “[a]bridged [f]indings [a]nd [c]onclusions”25 
incorporated into the document, and a 17-page errata set of 
recommendations).26
Part Two-Narrative-The Attacks of September 11, 2001 
consists of nine principal headings: 
I.  The Plot Unfolds for the Attacks of September 11, 2001.27
II.  Pentagon Flight Hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-
Hazmi and Salem al-Hazmi.28
III.  NASA Communication Intercepts Related to Khalid al-
Mihdhar, Nawaf and Salem al-Hazmi.29
IV.  Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar Had Numerous 
Contacts With an Active FBI Informant.30
V.   Associates of the September 11, 2001 Terrorists in the 
United States.31
  Part Four-Finding, Discussion and Narrative Regarding Certain  
  Sensitive National Security Matters 
  Glossary of Terms and Key Names 
  Additional Views of Members of the Joint Inquiry 
  Appendices 
Id. 
 23. Id. at ii-vii. 
 24. Id. at viii-x. 
 25. Id. at xi-xix. 
 26. U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE & U.S. HOUSE 
PERMANENT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON JOINT INQUIRY INTO 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST 
ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, S. REPT. NO. 107-351, H. REPT. NO. 107-792 
(Dec. 2002) (ERRATA PRINT) [hereinafter JOINT INQUIRY REPORT ERRATA 
PRINT]. 
 From the process perspective of congressional oversight of executive 
intelligence gathering, one is reminded of the scene in the movie MR. SMITH 
GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia Pictures, 1939) involving the character of 
Jefferson Smith, played by Jimmy Stewart, being flustered and rattled by the 
august presence of the more senior senator and his wiley daughter.  Stewart 
drops and fumbles with his hat throughout the scene, only to knock over a 
lamp at the end of the scene. 
 27. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 128. 
 28. Id. at 143. 
 29. Id. at 155.  A considerable portion of the content is deleted by 
brackets and strikethroughs. See id. at 155-57. 
 30. Id. at 157 (brackets omitted).  A considerable portion of the content is 
deleted by brackets and strikethroughs.  Id. at 157-68. 
 31. Id. at 168.  A considerable portion of the content is deleted by 
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VI.  Germany-Investigation of the Hamburg Cell.32
VII.  The Hijackers’ Visas.33
VIII. The Rising Threat and Context of the September 11  
 Attacks.34
IX. The Development of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy 
Before September 11.35
brackets and strikethroughs.  Id. at 168-83. 
 32. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 183.  A considerable portion 
of the content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs.  Id. at 183-87. 
 33. Id. at 187. 
 34. Id. at 190.  This heading of the JIR is subdivided into six sub-
headings: 
A. New Breed of Terrorists 
B. Emergence of Usama Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida 
C. Attributes of Bin Ladin’s Terrorist Operations 
D. Intelligence about Bin Ladin’s Intentions to Strike Inside the 
United States 
E. Indications of a Possible Terrorist Attack in Spring and Summer 
2001 
F. Intelligence Information on Possible Terrorist Use of Airplanes as 
Weapons. 
Id. at 191, 194, 196, 198, 203, 209. 
It should be noted that the JIR uses different spellings for Al Qaeda.  To 
the extent that I discuss matters in my own language I will utilize the 
aforementioned spelling.  Otherwise, when I am quoting the JIR I will use 
the spelling provided by Congress. 
 35. Id. at 215.  A considerable portion of the content is deleted by 
brackets and strikethroughs.  See id. at 215-49.  This heading of the JIR is 
subdivided into 19 sub-headings: 
A. Counterterrorism as an Intelligence Priority 
B. Growing Importance in the Clinton Administration 
C. Uncertainty During the Transition 
D. The George W. Bush Administration 
E. Competing Priorities 
F. Policy Measures to Fight Terrorism 
G. The Law Enforcement Approach 
H. Disruption and Renditions 
I. Afghanistan as a Terrorist Sanctuary 
J. The Intelligence Community 
K. The Declaration of War 
L. The Intelligence Community’s Response 
M. Shortcomings in the Intelligence Community’s Response 
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Part Three—Topics—The Attacks of September 11, 2001 
consists of fourteen principal headings: 
I.     Counterterrorism Resources.36
II.  Foreign Liaison.37
III.  Covert Action and Military Operations against Bin 
Ladin.38
IV.  Strategy to Disrupt Terrorist Funding.39
V.  Khalid Shaykh Mohammed: The Mastermind of 
September 11.40
VI.  The FBI’s Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui before 
September 11.41
VII.  The Phonemix Electronic Communication (EC).42
VIII.  Strategic Analyses.43
IX.  Views of Outside Experts on the Intelligence 
Community.44
N. The President and Senior Policy Advisor Responsibility 
O. Lack of an Integrated Response 
P. The Intelligence Community’s Failure to Establish a Coordinated 
Domestic Focus Before September 11, 2001 
Q. Steps Taken to Fight International Terrorism at Home 
R. Lack of Focus on Domestic Threat 
S. Limited Counterterrorism by Other Intelligence Community 
Members. 
Id. at 216-20, 222, 225-26, 229-32, 234, 236, 241, 243, 247. 
 36. Id. at 250. 
 37. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 270.  A considerable portion of 
the content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs.  See id. at 270-78. 
 38. Id. at 279.  The vast majority of the content is deleted by brackets 
and strikethroughs.  See id. at 279-307. 
 39. Id. at 308. 
 40. Id. at 309.  A considerable portion of the content is deleted by 
brackets and strikethroughs.  See id. at 309-15. 
 41. Id. at 315. 
 42. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 325. 
 43. Id. at 336.  This heading of the JIR is subdivided into four sub-
headings: 
A. The Intelligence Community’s Lack of Strategic Analysis 
B. Analyst Qualifications and Training 
C. Analysts’ Access to Information 
D. Language Skills 
Id. at 336, 339, 341, 343. 
 44. Id. at 345.  This heading of the JIR is subdivided into seven 
subheadings: 
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X.  Information Sharing.45
XI.  Technology Gaps.46
XII.  Technical Collection of Terrorist Communications.47
XIII.  Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection.48
XIV.  Summary of Joint Inquiry Review of Anthrax 
Attacks.49
The final part of the JIR in chief, Part Four—Finding, 
Discussion and Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive National 
Security Matters, is, perhaps, the most remarkable part of the 
Joint Inquiry Report.  The simple reason for its remarkability is 
that, with the exception of a bracketed finding and bracketed 
discussion (indicating the alternative language of the original JIR 
language cleared by the Intelligence Community), virtually all 
twenty-seven pages of this part are deleted! 50   
Following the JIR in chief is a “Glossary of Terms and 
Acronyms,”51 a table of “Key Names,”52 a table of “September 11, 
A. Setting Priorities 
B. Strategy and Organization 
C. Should a Strong Director of National Intelligence Be Established? 
D. Should the Same Person be both DNI and Director of the CIA? 
E. Counterterrorism Within the United States and Creation of a 
Domestic Intelligence Agency 
F. A Legislative Charter for the Intelligence Community 
G. Respect for the Rule of Law 
Id. at 346-49, 353. 
 45. Id. at 354. 
 46. Id. at 368.  The vast majority of the content is deleted by brackets 
and strikethroughs.  See id. at 368-73. 
 47. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 373.  The vast majority of the 
content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs.  See id. at 373-85. 
 48. Id. at 385.  A considerable portion of the content is deleted by 
brackets and strikethroughs.  See id. at 385-94. 
 49. Id. at 393. 
 50. See supra note 21, at 395-422 and accompanying text. 
 51. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 424-33.  Among the more 
fascinating definitions contained in this portion of the JIR are the following: 
Actionable Intelligence: 
Intelligence information that is directly useful to customers for 
immediate exploitation without having to go through the full 
intelligence production process; it may address strategic or tactical 
needs, close support of US negotiating teams, or action elements 
dealing with such matters as international terrorism or narcotics. 
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Id. at 424. 
Asset: 
(1) Any resource—a person, group, relationship, instrument, 
installation, supply—at the disposition of an intelligence agency for 
use in an operational or support role.  (2) A person who contributes 
to a clandestine mission but is not a fully controlled agent. 
Id. 
Clandestine Operation: 
A preplanned secret intelligence collection activity or covert political, 
economic, propaganda, or paramilitary action conducted so as to 
assure the secrecy of the operation; encompasses both clandestine 
collection and covert nation. 
Id. at 425. 
Classification: 
The determination that official information requires, in the interest 
of national security, a specific degree of protection against 
unauthorized disclosure, coupled with a designation signifying that 
such a determination has been made; the designation is normally 
termed a security classification and includes Confidential, Secret, 
and Top Secret. 
Id. 
Counterintelligence: 
Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against 
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations 
conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, persons, 
or terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, 
document, or communication security programs. 
Id. 
Counterterrorism: 
Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to a 
terrorist act or the documented threat of such an act. 
Id. at 425-26. 
Domestic Collection: 
The acquisition of foreign intelligence information within the United 
States from governmental or nongovernmental organizations or 
individuals who are witting sources and choose to cooperate by 
sharing such information. 
Id. at 427. 
IC: 
Intelligence Community—the aggregate of the following executive 
branch organizations and agencies involved in intelligence activities: 
the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the 
Defense Intelligence Agency; offices within the Department of 
Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence 
through  reconnaissance programs; the Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research of the Department of State; intelligence elements of the 
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2001 Hijackers,”53 “Additional Views of Members of the Joint 
Inquiry,”54 and a number of appendices attached at the end of the 
JIR.55
military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
Department of Treasury, and the Department of Energy; and staff 
elements of the office of the Director of Central Intelligence. 
Id. at 428-29. 
International Terrorism: 
Terrorist acts that transcend national boundaries in their conduct or 
purpose, the nationalities of the victims, or the resolution of the 
incident.  Such an act is usually designed to attract wide publicity to 
focus attention on the existence, cause, or demands of the 
perpetration. 
Id. at 429-30. 
PDB: 
President’s Daily Brief (prepared by CIA for President and very 
small number of other senior officials)[.] 
Id. at 431. 
 52. Id. at 434. 
 53. Id. at 435. 
 54. Id. (consisting of separately paginated additional views of Senator 
Richard C. Shelby, Representative Michael N. Castle, Senator Mike DeWine, 
Representative Jane Harman, Senator John Kyl and Senator Pat Roberts, 
Senator Carl Levin, Senator Barbara Mikulski, and Representative Tim 
Roemer). 
 55. Id.  The list of appendices to the JIR includes the following: 
• Initial Scope of Joint Inquiry. 
• Supplemental Joint Inquiry Rules. 
• Joint Inquiry Hearings. 
• List of Persons Interviewed. 
• Counterterrorism Organizations Within the Intelligence 
Community. 
• Evolution of the Terrorist Threat and the U.S. Response, 
1983-2001. 
• Selected Events in the Chronology of Terrorism, 1982-2001. 
• CIA/FBI Failures in Regard to Two September 11 Hijackers, 
The Phoenix Electronic Communication. 
• Moussaoui Related FBI Field Agent Notes and Field 
Office/Headquarters E-mails. 
• General Accounting Office: Analysis of U.S. Anthrax 
Attacks. 
• CTC Watchlisting Guidance—December 1999. 
• The Joint Inquiry in Court. 
• Access Limitations Encountered by the Joint Inquiry. 
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Id. (following page 435).  While a detailed discussion of these voluminous 
appendices is beyond the scope of this Article, it is tempting to offer a few 
miscellaneous comments.  First, most of the names on the Appendix List of 
Persons Interviewed are deleted by brackets and strikethroughs, although 
their official positions are referenced.  See id. app. at 1-21.  Second, the 
Appendix-Evolution of the Terrorist Threat and the U.S. Response, 1983-
2001, provides a synoptical summary of “big picture” world events, “selected 
major terrorist events,” and “U.S. institutional responses to terrorism,” 
although a considerable portion of the content is deleted by brackets and 
strikethroughs. See id. app. at 1-49.  Third, the Appendix-Selected Events in 
the Chronology of Terrorism, 1982-2001 offers a striking visual timeline of 
the following types of information: terrorist incidents, information indicating 
terrorist activity or intentions to strike inside the United States, information 
indicating terrorist activity or intentions to use airplanes as weapons, and 
communications intercepts suggesting possible imminent terrorist activities.  
See id. app. (consisting of eleven unnumbered pages).  Fourth, the Appendix 
Joint Inquiry in Court details the tripartite branch processes of the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches surrounding the investigation and litigation 
involving Zacarias Moussaoui—the suspected “20th  hijacker” on 9/11.  See 
id. app. at 1-5.  Legal counsel from the congressional offices of Senate Legal 
Counsel, House General Counsel, and General Counsel of the Joint Inquiry 
were involved in contesting a DOJ-sought judicial protective order in the 
Moussaoui case.  See id.  According to this Appendix: 
With the assistance of the Offices of Senate Legal Counsel and 
House General Counsel, the General Counsel of the Joint Inquiry . . . 
participated in the argument on August 29, 2002.  The reply asked 
the District Court to deny the DOJ’s requested relief for three main 
reasons: (1) the protective order does not govern testimony before 
Congress, nor does it govern the production of documents to 
Congress, the use of documents by it, or the issuance of its reports; 
(2) Local Criminal Rule 57 specifically does not preclude the holding 
of legislative hearings or the issuance of legislative reports, and (3) 
the proposed expansion of the [protective] order by the Department 
of Justice runs afoul of the separation of powers. 
Id. app. at 3.  The DOJ lost its motion to expand the scope of the Moussaoui 
judicial protective order to cover the Joint Inquiry legislative proceedings.  Id. 
at 4-5.  Yet, the following novel procedure was allowed by the Joint Inquiry: 
In accordance with its commitment to consult with the Department 
of Justice, the Joint Inquiry continued to allow DOJ to review and 
comment regarding the contents of staff statements related to the 
Moussaoui case and other matters.  At the Joint Inquiry’s September 
24 [2002] public hearing that followed concerning the Moussaoui 
matter, the Joint Inquiry permitted a DOJ representative to attend 
with FBI witnesses for the purpose of advising whether any question 
called for an answer that might impair the Moussaoui prosecution.  
Thus, the Inquiry was able to proceed with a full public exposition of 
the issues raised in the Moussaoui investigation without impeding 
the due process and fair interests of Moussaoui and the DOJ. 
Id. at 5. 
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III. THE JIR’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Joint Inquiry Report contains five key factual findings 
and conclusions about the events leading up to the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, sixteen “systemic findings” and 
conclusions about the American Intelligence Community’s 
deficient counterterrorist efforts before September 11, and four 
“related findings” and conclusions involving broader policy 
questions beyond the American Intelligence Community.  The 
discussion that follows attempts to deconstruct this “bureaucrat-
speak” and to reconceptualize these twenty-five congressional 
oversight findings and conclusions into nine generic process 
failures of the American Intelligence Community.  These nine 
process failures are as follows: (A) the Forest Versus the Trees 
Problem; (B) the Right Hand Versus the Left Hand Problem; (C) 
the Chicken Little Problem; (D) the “Who’s on First?” Problem; (E) 
the “Show Me the Money” Problem; (F) the Dueling Banjoes 
Problem; (G) the Through the Glass Darkly Problem; (H) the Good 
Cop/Bad Cop Problem; and (I) the Catch-22 Problem.  As will be 
discussed in greater detail below, these nine generic process 
failures of the American Intelligence Community are interrelated 
and intergovernmental (horizontal as well as vertical) in nature. 
A.  The Forest Versus the Trees Problem 
The bulk of the factual findings and conclusions of the JIR 
can be better understood as a problem of perspective: while the 
American Intelligence Community was obsessed with gathering 
discrete details, the process of intelligence lacked a strategic 
capability to put individual pieces of the terrorism puzzle into a 
coherent and holistic picture.  Thus, the factual findings 
concerning intelligence on the threats posed by Osama Bin 
Ladin,56 the Spring and Summer of 2001 information on Al 
 56. This factual finding of the JIR states: 
While the Intelligence Community had amassed a great deal of 
valuable intelligence regarding Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorist 
activities, none of it identified the time, place, and specific nature of 
the attacks that were planned for September 11, 2001.  Nonetheless, 
the Community did have information that was clearly relevant to the 
September 11 attacks, particularly when considered for its collective 
significance. 
Id. at xi. 
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Qaeda,57 1998-2001 intelligence,58 aircrafts and weapons data,59 
and the “collective significance” myopia60 essentially describe a 
 57. This factual finding of the JIR states: 
During the spring and summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community 
experienced a significant increase in information indicating that Bin 
Ladin and al-Qa’ida intended to strike against U.S. interests in the 
very near future. 
JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xi. 
 58. This factual finding of the JIR states: 
Beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer of 2001, the 
Intelligence Community received a modest, but relatively steady, 
stream of intelligence reporting that indicated the possibility of 
terrorist attacks within the United States.  Nonetheless, testimony 
and interviews confirm that it was the general view of the 
Intelligence Community, in the spring and summer of 2001, that the 
threatened Bin Ladin attacks would most likely occur against U.S. 
interests overseas, despite indications of plans and intentions to 
attack in the domestic United States. 
Id. 
 59. Factual finding 4 of the JIR states: 
From at least 1994, and continuing into the summer of 2001, the 
Intelligence Community received information indicating that 
terrorists were contemplating, among other means of attack, the use 
of aircraft as weapons.  This information did not stimulate any 
specific Intelligence Community assessment of, or collective U.S. 
Government reaction to, this form of threat. 
Id. 
 60. Factual finding number 5 of the JIR consists of an overarching 
finding and ten sub-findings numbered 5a through 5j, inclusive.  Overarching 
finding number 5 states: 
Although relevant information that is significant in retrospect 
regarding the attacks was available to the Intelligence Community 
prior to September 11, 2001, the Community too often failed to focus 
on that information and consider and appreciate its collective 
significance in terms of a probable terrorist attack.  Neither did the 
Intelligence Community demonstrate sufficient initiative in coming 
to grips with the new transnational threats.  Some significant pieces 
of information in the vast stream of data being collected were 
overlooked, some were not recognized as potentially significant at 
the time and therefore not disseminated, and some required 
additional action on the part of foreign governments before a direct 
connection to the hijackers could have been established.  For all 
those reasons, the Intelligence Community failed to fully capitalize 
on available, and potentially important, information. 
Id.  Five of the sub-findings relate to the Forest Versus the Trees Problem: 
sub-finding 5a, concerning “[t]errorist [c]ommunications in 1999” about 
persons who, after September 11, 2001, were connected with the terrorist 
attacks of that day, id. at xii (JIR brackets omitted); sub-finding 5b, 
concerning “Malaysia [m]eeting and [t]ravel of al-Qaida [o]peratives to the 
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failure of the American Intelligence Community to appreciate the 
“forest” that its “trees” of intelligence suggested.  Moreover, two of 
the four “related findings” in the Joint Inquiry Report are in the 
nature of a forest-versus-the-trees process failure of the American 
Intelligence Community: the failure of the U.S. Government to 
“undertake a comprehensive effort to implement defensive 
measures in the United States” despite intelligence information 
spanning the time of “1998 through the summer of 2001 indicating 
that Usama Bin Ladin’s terrorist network intended to strike 
inside the United States,”61 and the failure of the U.S. 
Government to benefit from “an alert, mobilized and committed 
American public” stemming from a lack of notice “to alert the 
American public to the reality and gravity of the threat” of 
terrorist attacks before September 11, 2001.62  Indeed, the general 
conclusion to the JIR factual findings consists of a lamentation 
over perspective failure before 9/11: 
In short, for a variety of reasons, the Intelligence 
Community failed to capitalize on both the individual and 
collective significance of available information that 
appears relevant to the events of September 11.  As a 
result, the Community missed opportunities to disrupt 
the September 11 plot by denying entry to or detaining 
would-be hijackers; to at least try to unravel the plot 
through surveillance and other investigative work within 
the United States; and, finally, to generate a heightened 
state of alert and thus harden the homeland against 
attack. 
No one will ever know what might have happened had 
United States” regarding a 2000 rendezvous between two individuals who 
had a key role in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, id.; sub-finding 5c, 
dealing with [t]errorist [c]ommunications in [s]pring 2000 regarding known 
communication involving an individual who had attended the Malaysia 
meeting, id.(JIR brackets omitted); sub-finding 5g, concerning “[h]ijackers in 
[c]ontact [w]ith [p]ersons of FBI [i]nvestigative [i]nterest in the United 
States,” id. at xiv; and sub-finding 5h, concerning the CIA’s awareness, but 
missed opportunities, of the [h]ijackers’ [a]ssociation in Germany.”  Id. (JIR 
brackets omitted). 
 61. Related finding 17 of the JIR, JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 
xviii. 
 62. Related finding 19 of the JIR, id. at xix. 
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more connections been drawn between these disparate 
pieces of information.  We will never definitively know to 
what extent the Community would have been able and 
willing to exploit fully all the opportunities that may have 
emerged.  The important point is that the Intelligence 
Community, for a variety of reasons, did not bring 
together and fully appreciate a range of information that 
could have greatly enhanced the chances of uncovering 
and preventing Osama Bin Ladin’s plan to attack these 
United States on September 11, 2001.63
Importantly, the first systemic finding also speaks of the 
fundamental failure of the American Intelligence Community to 
perceive the forest from the trees, noting that “[p]rior to 
September 11, the Intelligence Community was neither well 
organized nor equipped, and did not adequately adapt, to meet the 
challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets within the 
domestic Untied States” because of “[s]erious gaps [that] existed 
between the collection coverage provided by U.S. foreign and U.S. 
domestic intelligence capabilities” stemming from “inadequate 
attention” by the CIA “to the potential for a domestic attack” and 
the inability of the FBI “to identify and monitor effectively the 
extent of activity by al-Qa’ida and other international terrorist 
groups operating in the United States.”64
B.  The Right Hand Versus the Left Hand Problem 
A central feature of the factual findings and conclusions of the 
Joint Inquiry Report is professed amazement by Congress at the 
two distinct cultures of the CIA, on the one hand, and the FBI, on 
the other hand.  As one of the JIR’s factual findings expresses the 
problem, the right hand of the American Intelligence Community 
did not know what the left hand was up to in dealing with known 
terrorists in the United States before September 11: 
[Two key hijackers had] numerous contacts with a long 
time FBI counterterrorism informant in California 
and . . . a third future hijacker . . . apparently had more 
limited contact with the informant.  In mid-to-late-2000, 
 63. Conclusion to factual findings of the JIR, id. at xv (emphasis added). 
 64. Systemic finding 1, id. 
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the CIA already had information indicating that [two of 
the hijackers] had [been in the United States] but the two 
had not been watchlisted and information suggesting that 
two suspected terrorists could well be in the United 
States had not yet been given to the FBI.  The San Diego 
FBI field office that handled the informant in question, 
did not receive that information [from the CIA] or any of 
the other intelligence information pertaining to [two 
terrorists in the country] prior to September 11, 2001.  As 
a result, the FBI missed the opportunity to ask a 
uniquely well-positioned informant—who denies having 
any advance knowledge of the plot—to collect information 
about the hijackers and their plans within the United 
States.65
One systemic finding of the Joint Inquiry Report speaks of the 
two cultures dividing the CIA and the FBI and the attendant lack 
of information sharing between these agencies before September 
11.66  A related right hand/left hand systemic finding addresses 
the divide between the American Intelligence Community versus 
the non-Intelligence Community.67
 65. Factual sub-finding 5d, id. at xii-iii. 
 66. Systemic finding 9 of the JIR states: 
The U.S. Government does not presently bring together in one place 
all terrorism-related information from all sources.  While the CIA’s 
Counterterrorist Center does manage overseas operations and has 
access to most Intelligence Community information, it does not 
collect terrorism-related information from all sources, domestic and 
foreign.  Within the Intelligence Community, agencies did not 
adequately share relevant counterterrorism information, prior to 
September 11.  This breakdown in communications was the result of 
a number of factors, including differences in the agencies’ missions, 
legal authorities and cultures.  Information was not sufficiently 
shared, not only between different Intelligence Community agencies, 
but also within individual agencies, and between the intelligence 
and the law enforcement agencies. 
JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvii. 
 67. Systemic finding 10 of the JIR provides: 
Serious problems in information sharing also persisted prior to 
September 11, between the Intelligence Community and relevant 
non-Intelligence Community agencies.  This included other federal 
agencies as well as state and local authorities.  This lack of 
communication and collaboration deprived those other entities, as 
well as the Intelligence Community, of access to potentially valuable 
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C.  The Chicken Little Problem 
The well-known children’s story about Chicken Little is a 
cautionary tale about the dangers of over-reaction.68  The deeper 
social problem  illustrated by the Chicken Little parable, however, 
is when real dangers are underappreciated and under-deterred.  
Part of this problem might stem from past exaggerations.  
Alternatively, part of the problem might arise from too many 
tasks and not enough resources.  In either case, it is apparent that 
the congressional investigation discerned a kind of problem where 
FBI superiors underappreciated real dangers of domestic terrorist 
attacks from domestically trained terrorist-pilots.  According to an 
eerie JIR factual finding: 
On July 10, 2001, an FBI Phoenix field office agent sent 
an “Electronic Communication” to 4 individuals in the 
Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) and two people in 
the Usama Bin Ladin Unit (UBLU) at FBI headquarters, 
and to two agents on International Terrorist squads in 
the New York Field office.  In the communication, the 
agent expressed his concerns, based on his first-hand 
knowledge, that there was a coordinated effort underway 
by Bin Ladin to send students to the United States for 
civil aviation-related training.  He noted that there was 
an “inordinate number of individuals of investigative 
interest” in this type of training in Arizona and expressed 
his suspicion that this was an effort to establish a cadre 
of individuals in civil aviation who would conduct future 
terrorist activity.  The Phoenix [electronic 
communication] requested that FBI Headquarters 
consider implementing four recommendations: 
• accumulate a list of civil aviation 
university/colleges around the country; 
• establish liaison with these schools; 
information in the “war” against Bin Ladin.  The Inquiry’s focus on 
the Intelligence Community limited the extent to which it explored 
these issues, and this is an area that should be reviewed further. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 68. For an updated version, see JAMES FINN GARNER, POLITICALLY 
CORRECT BEDTIME STORIES 57-62 (1994). 
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• discuss the theories contained in the Phoenix 
[electronic communication] with the Intelligence 
Community; and 
• consider seeking authority to obtain visa 
information concerning individuals seeking to 
attend flight schools. 
However, the FBI headquarters personnel did not take the action 
requested by the Phoenix agent prior to September 11, 2001.  The 
communication generated little or no interest at either FBI 
Headquarters or the FBI’s New York field office.69
D.  The “Who’s On First?” Problem 
While the late comedic team of Abbott and Costello achieved 
regular laughs in performing their play on words involving 
different baseball runners with pronouns for names,70 one way of 
interpreting their routine is as a moral tale of the organizational 
risks of widespread incompetence.  Numerous findings of the Joint 
 69. Factual sub-finding 5e, JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xii.  
For a journalistic account of the FBI and international terrorism leading up 
to the events of 9/11, see generally PETER LANCE, 1000 YEARS FOR REVENGE: 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE FBI—THE UNTOLD STORY (2003).  In the 
discussion supporting factual sub-finding 5e, the JIR suggests that the 
problem was, at bottom, a resource issue.  Before the Joint Inquiry, the 
Phoenix agent who authored the Phoenix communication testified that: 
“What I wanted was an analytical product.  I wanted this discussed with the 
Intelligence Community.  I wanted to see if my hunches were correct.”  He 
noted, however, that he also knew this type of analytical product took a back 
seat to operational matters at the FBI: 
But, I am also a realist.  I understand that the people at FBI 
Headquarters are terribly overworked and understaffed, and 
they have been for years.  And at the time that I am . . . sending 
this in, having worked this stuff for 13 years, and watched the 
unit in action over the years, I knew that this was going to be at 
the bottom of the pile, so to speak, because they were dealing 
with real-time threats, real-time issues trying to render 
fugitives back to the United States from overseas for justice.  
And again, it is a resource issue. 
The Phoenix agent was correct, and his communication did fall to the bottom of 
the pile. 
JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 20-21. 
 70. BUD ABBOTT AND LOU COSTELLO, Who’s On First?, in THE NAUGHTY 
NINETIES (Universal 1945). 
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Inquiry Report portray an incompetent American Intelligence 
Community (an oxymoron of sorts) in disarray.  In the first place, 
three JIR factual sub-findings relate to specific instances of 
organizational incompetence leading up to September 11.  One 
sub-finding addresses the legal mistake of FBI officials 
investigating suspected confederates in the 9/11 hijackings;71 
another sub-finding focuses on the maladroit manner in which 
American officials handled the mastermind of the September 11 
attacks while he was awaiting a trial for an earlier act of 
terrorism;72 and a third sub-finding deals with bungling by the 
 71. Factual sub-finding 5f, JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xiii-
xiv.  The sub-finding provides: 
In August 2001, the FBI’s Minneapolis field office, in conjunction 
with the INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service], detained 
Zacarias Massouri, a French national who had enrolled in flight 
training in Minnesota.  FBI agents there also suspected that 
Moussaoui was involved in a hijacking plot.  FBI Headquarters 
attorneys determined that there was not probable cause to obtain a 
court order to search Moussaoui’s belongings under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).  However, personnel at FBI 
Headquarters, including the Radical Fundamentalism Unit and the 
National Security Law Unit, as well as agents in the Minneapolis 
field office, misunderstood the legal standards for obtaining an order 
under FISA.  As a result, FBI Minneapolis field office personnel 
wasted valuable investigative resources trying to connect the 
Chechen rebels to al-Qa’ida.  Finally, no one at the FBI apparently 
connected Moussaoui investigation with the heightened threat 
environment in the summer of 2001, the Phoenix communication, or 
the entry of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi into the United States. 
Id. 
 72. Factual sub-heading 5i, id. at xiv.  The sub-finding states: 
Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community had information 
linking Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM), now recognized by the 
Intelligence Community as the mastermind of the attacks to Bin 
Ladin, to terrorist plans to use an aircraft as weapons, and to 
terrorist activity in the United States.  The Intelligence Community, 
however, relegated . . . KSM to rendition target status following his 
1996 indictment in connection with the Bojinka Plot and, as a result, 
focused primarily on his location, rather than his activities and place 
in the al-Qa’ida hierarchy.  The Community also did not recognize 
the significance of reporting in June 2001 concerning KSM’s active 
role in sending terrorists to the United States, or the facilitation of 
their activities upon arriving in the United States.  Collection efforts 
were not targeted on information about KSM that might have helped 
better understand al-Qa’ida’s plans and intentions and KSM’s role in 
the September 11 attacks was a surprise to the Intelligence 
Community. 
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National Security Agency (NSA) in neglecting to translate and 
disseminate intercepted communications that indicated the threat 
of imminent terrorist attacks in September of 2001.73
In the second place, six systemic findings in the Joint Inquiry 
Report are properly categorized as “Who’s on First?” Problems.  
First, systemic finding 2 states: 
Prior to September 11, 2001, neither the U.S. 
Government as a whole nor the Intelligence Community 
had a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy for 
combating the threat posed by Usama Bin Ladin.  
Furthermore, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 
was either unwilling or unable to marshal the full range 
of Intelligence Community resources necessary to combat 
the growing threat to the United States.74
Interestingly, the JIR discussion supporting this systemic 
finding notes that “[t]he Intelligence Community is a large 
distributed organism.  It encompasses 14 agencies and tens of 
thousands of employees” and “[t]he number of people employed 
exclusively in the effort against Usama Bin Ladin and Al-Qaeda 
was relatively small.”75  Yet, revealingly, Congress found that 
“these people were operating in geographically dispersed locations, 
often not connected by secure information technologies, and 
within established bureaucracies that were not culturally or 
organizationally attuned to one another’s requirements,” while 
“[m]any of them had limited experience against the target and did 
not know one another[,]” but “[t]o achieve success in such an 
environment, leadership is a critical factor” and “the Intelligence 
Community’s structure made leadership difficult.”76  Moreover, in 
a searing indictment of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 
Id. 
 73. Factual sub-finding 5j, id. at xv.  The sub-finding provides: 
In the period from September 8 to September 10, 2001, NSA 
intercepted, but did not translate or disseminate until after 
September 11, some communications that indicated possible 
impending terrorist activity. 
Id. (brackets omitted).  The discussion supporting sub-finding 5j is largely 
deleted or bracketed.  Id. at 32. 
 74. Id. at xvi. 
 75. Id. at 39. 
 76. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 39. 
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the Joint Inquiry Report discussion concludes that the record 
“indicates that the DCI did not marshal resources effectively even 
within the CIA against the threat posed by al-Qa’ida” and 
“[d]espite the DCI’s declaration to CIA officials that the Agency 
was at war with Bin Ladin . . . the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center 
needed additional personnel prior to September 11, and the lack of 
resources had a substantial impact on its ability to detect and 
monitor al-Qa’ida’s activities.”77
Second, systematic finding 5, at its heart, rails against the 
rampant incompetence of the American Intelligence officials, 
stating: 
Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community’s 
understanding of al Qa’ida was hampered by insufficient 
analytic focus and quality, particularly in terms of 
strategic analysis.  Analysis and analysts were not 
always used effectively because of the perception in some 
quarters of the Intelligence Community that they were 
less important to agency counterterrorism missions than 
were operations/personnel.  The quality of 
counterterrorism analysis was inconsistent, and many 
analysts were inexperienced, unqualified, under-trained, 
and without access to critical information.  As a result, 
there was a dearth of creative, aggressive analysis 
targeting Bin Ladin and a persistent inability to 
comprehend the collective significance of individual 
pieces of intelligence.  These analytic deficiencies 
seriously undercut the ability of U.S. policymakers to 
understand the full nature of the threat, and to make 
fully informed decisions.78
The JIR’s discussion in support of this systematic finding 
points out the absence of dissenting opinions in the Intelligence 
Community’s analysis provided to government policymakers, 
quoting the testimony of the Deputy Secretary of State, Richard 
Armitage, who observed: 
I am the consumer.  It’s very rare that we get the one off 
voice or the dissident voice . . . . For a policy maker, the 
 77. Id. at 41. 
 78. Id. at xvi. 
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dissident voice is very helpful to either confirm what you 
think or really open up a new area, and this is not 
generally done.  If I had to say the one biggest weakness 
in the analysis area, I would say that’s it.  Second, it’s the 
way analysis in the Intelligence Community is generally 
put forth, and it’s related, and that is consensus . . . . I 
really would just enforce this observation about the need 
to get alternative views up, because most everything 
that’s important here is shrouded in ambiguity and 
uncertainty.  There is a tendency to want to get things 
scrubbed out to get the differences eliminated.79
Third, systemic finding 8 addresses a “Who’s on First?” 
Problem: “the continuing erosion of NSA’s [National Security 
Agency’s] program management expertise and experience has 
hindered its contribution to the fight against terrorism.  NSA 
continues to have mixed results in providing timely technical 
solutions to modern intelligence collection, analysis, and 
information sharing problems.”80
Fourth, systemic finding 11 focuses on ineptness, stating: 
Prior to September 11, 2001, the Intelligence Community 
did not effectively develop and use human sources to 
penetrate the al-Qa’ida inner circle.  This lack of reliable 
and knowledgeable human sources significantly limited 
the Community’s ability to acquire intelligence that could 
be acted upon before the September 11 attacks.  In part, 
at least, the lack of unilateral (i.e., U.S.-recruited) 
counterterrorism sources was a product of an excessive 
reliance on foreign liaison services.81
Fifth, systemic finding 15 is related to the aforementioned 
systemic finding 11.82  According to systemic finding 15, the 
 79. Id. at 68. 
 80. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvii.  The discussion in 
support of this systemic finding mentions a lack of basic skills by NSA 
personnel, “frustration regarding their current working environment,” and “a 
high level of frustration among contractors who do business with the NSA.”  
Id. at 76-77. 
 81. Id. at xvii.  The discussion in support of this systemic finding has 
been sanitized by substantial deletion of national security sensitive 
information.  See id. at 90-96. 
 82. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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American Intelligence Community “depended [too] heavily on 
foreign intelligence and law enforcement services for the collection 
of counterterrorism intelligence and the conduct of 
counterterrorism activities,” while “fail[ing] to coordinate their 
relationships with foreign services adequately.”83
Finally, systemic finding 16 also reminds one of Abbott and 
Costello’s famous routine.  It states, in a sanitized version that 
had to be rewritten by congressional staffers to satisfy national 
security reviewers: 
The activities of the September 11 hijackers in the United 
 States appear to have been financed, in large part, from 
 monies sent to them from abroad and also brought on 
 their persons.  Prior to September 11, there was no 
 coordinated U.S. Government-wide strategy to track 
 terrorist funding and  close down their financial support 
 networks.  There was also a reluctance in some parts of 
 the U.S. Government to track terrorist funding and close 
 down their financial support networks.  As a result, the 
 U.S. Government was unable to disrupt financial support 
 for Usama Bin Ladin’s terrorist  activities effectively.84
E.  The “Show Me the Money” Problem 
The phrase “show me the money” was made popular in the 
film Jerry Maguire when co-star Cuba Gooding Jr., as Rod 
Tidwell, the pro football player/client, sticks by his sports agent, 
Jerry Maguire, and insists that Maguire “show me the money.”85  
It is an apt phrase to remind us of the importance of money—and 
the converse situation of a lack of money—in carrying out the pre-
September 11 counterterrorism responsibilities of the United 
States Intelligence Community. Two systemic findings in the 
Joint Inquiry Report address “show me the money” problems: 
systemic findings 3 and 6. 
 83. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xviii.  The discussion in 
support of this systemic finding is mostly uninformative because of the 
substantial deletion of national security sensitive information.  See id. at 109-
13. 
 84. Id. at xviii (brackets omitted).  As one would expect in a situation 
where even the systemic finding, itself, was subject to revision on grounds of 
national security, the discussion supporting this finding is likewise sanitized.  
See id. at 113-17. 
 85. JERRY MAGUIRE (Columbia/Tristar 1996). 
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Systemic finding 3 essentially blames inefficiencies in funding 
processes—involving both Congress and the Intelligence 
Community—coupled with a multiplicity of appropriation 
requirements and priorities in hindering an effective anti-
terrorism policy in the United States before 9/11.86  As explained 
in cleaned-up-for-national-security language supporting this 
systemic finding: “throughout the Joint Inquiry, numerous 
officials . . . testified that the greatest constraint in their effort 
against al-Qa’ida was the availability of too few resources, 
compounded by too many requirements and priorities.”87
Systemic finding 6 focuses on the lack of resources in 
translating foreign language terrorist information.88  The JIR 
discussion on this point simply observes: 
The language problem has been one of the Intelligence 
Community’s perennial shortfalls.  Prior to September 11, 
the shortages of language specialists who would be 
qualified to process large amounts of foreign language 
data in general, and Arabic in particular, was one of the 
most serious issues limiting the Intelligence Community’s 
ability to analyze, discern, and report on terrorist 
activities in a timely fashion.89
F.  The Dueling Banjoes Problem 
The 1973 film, Deliverance, introduced the “dueling banjoes” 
 86. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvi.  Systemic finding 3 
states: 
Between the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001, overall 
Intelligence Community funding fell or remained even in constant 
dollars, while funding for the Community’s counterterrorism efforts 
increased considerably.  Despite these increases, the accumulation of 
intelligence priorities, a burdensome requirement process, the 
overall decline in Intelligence Community funding, and reliance on 
supplemental appropriations made it difficult to allocate Community 
resources effectively against an evolving terrorist threat.  
Inefficiencies in the resource and requirements process were 
compounded by problems in Intelligence Community budgeting 
practices and procedures. 
Id. 
 87. Id. at 46 (brackets omitted). 
 88. Id. at xvi. 
 89. Id. at 70. 
BLOMQUIST 1/8/2006  3:38 PM 
30 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.11:1 
 
scene and subsequent hit song featuring two banjo players trying 
to out perform and compete with one another.90  While this 
analogy to the American Intelligence Community and military is 
imperfect (in the film a certain synergy developed from the 
competition while the pre-9/11 era American governmental actions 
were discordant), the analogy is of use in depicting the degree of 
competitiveness between segments of the federal government in 
fighting terrorism.  Two systemic findings in the Joint Inquiry 
Report deal with “dueling banjoes” issues: systemic findings 7 and 
14. 
Systemic finding 7 highlights the friction between three key 
government intelligence agencies: the FBI, the CIA and the 
NSA.91  One type of ongoing conflict was between the NSA and the 
FBI over which agency should collect potentially terroristic 
communications between individuals within the United States.  
This created what the JIR calls a “gap . . . between the level of 
coverage of communications between the United States and 
foreign countries that was technically and legally available to the 
Intelligence Community and the actual use of that surveillance 
capability.”92  Another type of perennial friction was between the 
NSA and the CIA over “which agency was in charge of developing 
and using…technology when human intelligence and signals 
intelligence targets overlapped.”93  Specifically, the “CIA perceived 
NSA as wanting to control technology deployment and 
development, while NSA was concerned that CIA was conducting 
NSA-type operations.”94
 90. ERIC WEISSBERG & STEVE MANDEL, Dueling Banjos, on THE ORIGINAL 
SOUNDTRACK: DELIVERANCE (Warner Brothers 1973). 
 91. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvii.  Systemic finding 7, in 
sanitized language, provides: 
Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community’s ability to 
produce significant and timely signals intelligence on 
counterterrorism was limited by NSA’s failure to address modern 
communications technology aggressively, continuing conflict between 
Intelligence Community agencies, NSA’s cautious approach to any 
collection of intelligence relating to activities in the United States, 
and insufficient collaboration between NSA and FBI regarding the 
potential for terrorist attacks within the United States. 
Id. (brackets omitted). 
 92. Id. at 74-75 (brackets omitted). 
 93. Id. at 75 (brackets omitted). 
 94. Id. (brackets omitted). 
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Systemic finding 14 addresses the distrust and tension 
between the American military and the CIA in failing to better 
coordinate operations against Al Qaeda before September 11.95  
From the CIA’s perspective, “the U.S. military often levied so 
many requirements for highly detailed, actionable intelligence 
prior to conducting an operation—far beyond what the 
Intelligence Community was ever likely to obtain—that the U.S. 
military units were effectively precluded from conducting 
operations against Bin Ladin’s organization” in south central Asia 
prior to September 11.96  A former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, however, believed that it was not the military’s key mission 
to go after Bin Ladin; rather, he thought “that the CIA and FBI 
should have the lead roles in countering terrorism, and that 
military tools should be viewed as an extension and supplement to 
the leading roles played by the CIA and FBI.”97  Moreover, the 
former Chairman was of the view that “actionable intelligence” 
was too weak to outweigh the risks of military operations that 
would attempt to “swoop” and pursue terrorists in an undeclared 
war in another country.98  Despite these conflicting positions from 
top government officials, the JIR indicates that some cooperation 
between the CIA and the military directed at Bin Ladin did ensue 
prior to 9/11.99
 95. See id. at xviii.  Systemic finding 14, edited for reasons of national 
security, states: 
Senior U.S. military officials were reluctant to use U.S. military 
assets to conduct offensive counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan, 
or to support or participate in CIA operations directed against al-
Qa’ida prior to September 11.  At least part of this reluctance was 
driven by the military’s view that the Intelligence Community was 
unable to provide the intelligence needed to support military 
operations.  Although the U.S. military did participate in [ —— ] 
counterterrorism efforts to counter Usama Bin Ladin’s terrorist 
network prior to September 11, 2001, most of military’s focus was on 
force protection. 
Id.  (brackets omitted). 
 96. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 107. 
 97. Id. at 106. 
 98. Id. 
 99. These included cruise missile attacks against Bin Ladin on August 
20, 1998, “following the bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa,” id. at 
108; positioning of U.S. naval vessels in the North Arabian Sea between 1999 
and 2001 “to launch additional cruise missile strikes at Bin Ladin in the 
event the Intelligence Community was able to obtain precise information on 
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G.  The Through the Glass Darkly Problem 
According to scripture, some things we see “face to face” and 
completely; other things we see “through a glass, darkly” and 
know only in part.100  In other words, it is difficult to see through a 
turgid medium—even under the best of circumstances. Systemic 
finding 12 of the Joint Inquiry Report concentrates on the 
Through the Glass Darkly Problem in stating: 
During the summer of 2001, when the Intelligence 
Community was bracing for an imminent al-Qa’ida 
attack, difficulties with FBI applications for Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) surveillance and the 
FISA process led to a diminished level of coverage of 
suspected al-Qa’ida operatives in the United States.  The 
effect of these difficulties was compounded by the 
perception that spread among FBI personnel at 
Headquarters and the field offices that the FISA process 
was lengthy and fraught with peril.101
This turgidness was one of law and the perception of law.  
Judicial interpretations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA) supposedly led to a chilling effect on FBI agents who 
stopped applying for electronic surveillance orders directed at Al 
Qaeda suspects.102
H.  The Good Cop/Bad Cop Problem 
The “good cop/bad cop” paradigm is useful in describing 
scenarios where, on the one hand, rules and processes are 
scrupulously observed, and, on the other hand, these rules and 
processes are ruthlessly ignored.103  Systemic finding 18 of the 
his whereabouts in Afghanistan,” id.; and military assistance “in the 
development of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle as a second source of 
intelligence on Usama Bin Ladin’s precise whereabouts in Afghanistan.”  Id. 
 100. 1 Corinthians 13:12 states: “For now we see through a glass, darkly; 
but then face-to-face; now I know, in part, then shall I know even as also I am 
known.” 
 101. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvii. 
 102. Id. at 96-97. 
 103. My sense of using the term “good cop, bad cop” differs a bit from its 
typical use as “a psychological tactic, often used by police for interrogation.”  
Thus: 
Two ‘cops’ alternate their interviews.  The ‘Bad Cop’ behaves 
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Joint Inquiry Report can be understood as presenting a good 
cop/bad cop dichotomy.  It states: 
Between 1996 and September 2001, the counterterrorism 
strategy adopted by the U.S. Government did not succeed 
in eliminating Afghanistan as a sanctuary and training 
ground for Usama Bin Ladin’s terrorist network.  A range 
of instruments were used to counter al-Qa’ida, with law 
enforcement often emerging as a leading tool because 
other means were deemed not to be feasible or failed to 
produce results. While generating numerous successful 
prosecutions, law enforcement efforts were not adequate 
by themselves to target or eliminate Bin Ladin’s 
sanctuary.  The United States persisted in observing the 
rule of law and accepted norms of international behavior, 
but Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida recognized no rules and 
thrived in the safe haven provided by Afghanistan.104
The JIR expounds on this finding by pointing out the 
incredible naiveté, at best, or recklessness, at worst, of the 
executive branch of the United States government during the 
period between 1996 and 9/11.  According to the report’s 
discussion, “[s]ome CIA analysts and operators . . . recognized as 
early as 1997 or 1998 that, as long as the Taliban continued to 
grant Bin Ladin’s terrorist organization sanctuary in Afghanistan, 
it would continue to train a large cadre of Islamic extremists and 
generate numerous terrorist operations.”105  Yet there was no 
systematic executive branch effort to use all available means to 
root out and disable Bin Ladin.  As noted in the JIR: “Despite the 
Intelligence Community’s growing recognition that Afghanistan 
was churning out thousands of radicals, the U.S. government did 
not integrate all the instruments of national power and policy—
negatively toward the subject, making blatant accusations, 
derogatory comments, threats, and in general raising the subject’s 
antipathy.  This sets the stage for the ‘Good Cop’ to deceptively act 
supportive, understanding, defensive, and in general show sympathy 
for the subject, which may make the subject cooperative towards the 
latter. 
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Good_cop/bad_cop (last visited Oct. 
26, 2005). 
 104. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xviii-xix (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. at 120. 
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diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and military—to address this 
problem.”106  Moreover, the analysis goes on to state that 
“[p]ermitting the sanctuary in Afghanistan to exist for as long as 
it did allowed Bin Ladin’s key operatives to meet, plan operations, 
train recruits, identify particularly capable recruits or those with 
specialized skills, and ensure that al-Qa’ida’s masterminds 
remained beyond the reach of international justice.”107
The JIR’s most incisive support for its “good cop/bad cop” 
systemic finding culminates in the following discussion: 
The reliance on law enforcement when individuals can 
operate from a hostile country such as the Taliban’s 
Afghanistan appears particularly ineffective, as the 
masterminds are often beyond the reach of justice.  One 
FBI agent, in a Joint [I]nquiry interview, scorned the idea 
of using the [FBI] to take the lead in countering al-Qa’ida.  
He noted that the FBI can only arrest and support 
prosecution and cannot shut down training camps in 
hostile countries.  He added that, “it is like telling the 
FBI after Pearl Harbor, go to Tokyo and arrest the 
Emperor.”  In his opinion, a military solution was 
necessary because, “the Southern District of New York 
doesn’t have any cruise missiles.”108
I.  The Catch-22 Problem 
This “Catch-22” Problem, of course, is inspired by Joseph 
Heller’s famous post-World War II novel109 which describes an 
American military rule allowing airmen to contend that they were 
mentally unfit, and thereby unable to fly more missions, with a 
cognate rule that such a claim conclusively indicated that a 
complaining airman was not crazy and would, therefore, have to 
fly more missions.110  As I use this phrase, it seeks to convey the 
 106. Id. at 121 (brackets omitted).  Tellingly, there is a bracketed and 
deleted two and a half sentences set forth in the JIR after the quoted 
sentence in the text—presumably a detailed assessment of specific executive 
branch failings to support the topic sentence of the paragraph—excised by 
national security censors.  Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 123 (brackets omitted in last two sentences). 
 109. See JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 45-46 (1961). 
 110. See id. 
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absurdity of having the United States Congress, seeking to 
publicly assess and critique the executive branch’s intelligence 
failures in the years leading up to September 11, 2001, hamstrung 
by national security censors in the executive branch so that 
certain intelligence failures are unknowable by virtue of their 
deletion in the Joint Inquiry Report. 
The Catch-22 Problem is most prominently portrayed in JIR 
systemic finding 13, which consists of ten lines of bracketed and 
deleted text; not one word remains in the Joint Inquiry Report of 
systemic finding 13!111  We are given tantalizing hints of the 
content of systemic finding 13 in the discussion portion of the 
report.  First, the JIR, in sanitized prose, indicates that “[d]uring 
his tenure, President Clinton signed documents authorizing CIA 
covert action against Osama Bin Ladin and his principal 
lieutenants.”112  This analysis is followed by twenty lines of 
deleted text (including two bulleted items amid this text).  What 
are we to make of this?  Like an archaeologist who finds a shard of 
pottery at an excavation site, we have little to go on other than the 
seeming relevance of presidentially-authorized CIA covert action. 
Second, we get another clue in the sanitized text which 
follows these deletions: 
Former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger testified 
to the Joint Inquiry . . . that, from the time of the East 
Africa U.S. Embassy bombings in 1998, the U.S. 
Government was: 
. . . embarked on an [sic] very intense effort to get Bin 
Ladin, to get his lieutenants, thorough overt and covert 
means . . . . We were involved—at that point, our intense 
focus was to get Bin Ladin, to get his key lieutenants.  
The President conferred a number of authorities on the 
Intelligence Community for that purpose [sic]. 
 Senator Shelby: By “get him,” that means kill him if you 
 had to, capture or kill him? 
 Mr. Berger: I don’t know what I can say in this hearing, but 
 capture and kill . . . . There was no question that the cruise 
 missiles were not trying to capture him.  They were not law 
 111. See JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvii-xviii. 
 112. Id. at 98 (brackets omitted). 
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 enforcement techniques . . . .”113
 
Aha!  If we were archeologists that clue might be likened to 
finding the rest of the pottery such that we can now tell that the 
original shard came from a container which held precious potions.  
Systemic finding 13 must deal (we would surmise) with the CIA’s 
covert attempts to kill Bin Ladin and his henchmen! 
A third clue to the probable substance of the JIR systemic 
finding 13 is an unsanitized quote: “As former National Security 
Advisor Berger noted in his Joint Inquiry interview, ‘we do not 
have a rogue CIA.’”114  A “rogue” CIA?  Does this mean that 
Congress was onto some misbehavior of CIA operatives in trying 
to “get” Bin Ladin?  We are quickly disabused of this inference, 
however, in the fourth scrap of discussion commentary in the JIR 
that ostensibly supports the phantom systemic finding 13, quoting 
from the briefing provided by national security official Richard 
Clarke:115
I think if you look at the 1980s and 1970s, the individuals 
who held the job of DDO, one after another of them was 
either fired or indicted or condemned by a Senate 
committee.  I think under those circumstances, if you 
become Director of Operations, you would want to be a 
little careful not to launch off on covert operations that 
will get you personally in trouble and will also hurt the 
institution.  The history of covert operations in the 1950s 
and 1960s and 1970s was not a happy one, and I think 
that lesson got over-learned by people . . . . I think that 
they institutionalized a sense of covert action is risky and 
is likely to blow up in your face.  And the wise guys at the 
White House who are pushing you to do covert action will 
be nowhere to be found when the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence calls you up to explain the mess that the 
covert action became.116
So we suppose—but really cannot be sure—that the JIR 
 113. Id. at 98-99 (brackets omitted). 
 114. Id. at 99. 
 115. As of April of 2004, Richard Clarke’s exposé book on pre-9/11 events 
was a national bestseller.  Cf. RICHARD CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES (2004). 
 116. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 99-100 (emphasis added). 
BLOMQUIST 1/8/2006  3:38 PM 
2005] CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 37 
 
concluded that the CIA did a lousy job of “getting” Bin Ladin 
because of a culture that had developed in the American 
Intelligence Community that disfavored and discouraged covert 
operations. 
The Catch-22 Problem is also apparent in the sketchy, 
sanitized related finding 20,117 and the breathtaking twenty-seven 
pages of backup discussion that is redacted and deleted in the 
Joint Inquiry Report!118  We know by reading a sanitized version 
of finding 20 at the back of the JIR that it deals with “information 
suggesting specific sources of foreign support for some of the 
September 11 hijackers while they were in the United States”119 
and information “concerning these potential sources of support.”120  
We also know that the JIR complained about the “gap in U.S. 
intelligence coverage,” and admonished that “[t]he Intelligence 
Community needs to address this area of concern as aggressively 
and as quickly as possible.”121  That’s it!  Was it secret support 
from Saudi Arabian sources that is hinted at in the sanitized 
language of the Joint Inquiry Report?122
IV. THE JIR’S RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a sign of the haste (and perhaps sloppiness) with which the 
Joint Inquiry Report was put together, nineteen specific 
recommendations were “inadvertently” left out of the JIR when 
they should have been included following the findings and 
 117. See id. at xix.  The language of finding 20 in the summary findings 
simply states: “Located in Part Four entitled “Finding, Discussion and 
Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive National Security Matters.”  Id.  A 
sanitized, expanded version of finding 20 is found buried at the end of the 
report.  Id. at 395. 
 118. See id. at 296-422.  Isolated, unhelpful words and phrases are 
sprinkled throughout these pages.  See, e.g., id. at 406 (“The Joint Inquiry 
also found”), 413 (“In testimony before the Joint Inquiry”), 416 (“Finally”).  
Why did Congress bother to insert these inane phrases amid a sea of deleted 
pages? 
 119. Id. at 395 (brackets omitted). 
 120. Id. (brackets omitted). 
 121. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 395 (brackets omitted). 
 122. See generally LANCE, supra note 69.  Cf. BOB GRAHAM, INTELLIGENCE 
MATTERS: THE CIA, THE FBI, SAUDI ARABIA, AND THE FAILURE OF AMERICA’S 
WAR ON TERROR 168-69, 202, 216, 225, 229 (2004) (arguing financial support of 
Saudi Arabia for terrorists). 
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conclusions portion of the congressional document.123  A cynic 
would be tempted to conclude that Congress had become so 
accustomed to having scores of pages of the JIR deleted by 
executive branch national security censors that they thought it 
would be a good idea to omit the Congressional recommendations 
as well. 
The congressional recommendations contained in the “errata 
print” addendum to the Joint Inquiry Report can be usefully 
divided into three overarching categories: (A) suggested statutory 
changes in national security laws, legislative budgetary changes, 
and the like; (B) requested reports from executive branch agencies 
on national security topics; and (C) suggested executive branch 
actions on national security.  Some numbered recommendations in 
the JIR errata print contain more than one category of suggested 
governmental changes; therefore, I will not bother to reference 
recommendations by number, but will simply cite the relevant 
pages of the JIR errata print. 
A.  Suggested Statutory or Budgetary Changes in National 
Security Laws 
The first and most prominent recommendation for statutory 
or budgetary changes in national security laws is that Congress 
should “amend the National Security Act of 1947 to create and 
sufficiently staff a statutory Director of National Intelligence who 
shall be the President’s principal advisor on intelligence,”124 with 
the Director—a “Cabinet level position”125—“hav[ing] the full 
range of management, budgetary and personnel responsibilities 
needed to make the entire U.S. Intelligence Community operate as 
a coherent whole.”126  As part of the JIR’s recommendation, the 
Director of National Intelligence would have the legal authority, 
presumably set by federal statute, for the: (1) “establishment and 
 123. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 1.  Sloppiness is 
further apparent in the ERRATA print’s footnoted reference to a “[l]ist of 
previous commissions that addressed intelligence organizational issues, 
1990-present” and its omission of these commissions from both the original 
JIR and the ERRATA print.  Perhaps, the footnote is a sloppy reference to the 
“Appendix-Evolution of the Terrorist Threat and the U.N. Response, 1983-
2001.” JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at App. 5-49. 
 124. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 2 (footnote omitted). 
 125. Id. at 3. 
 126. Id. at 2. 
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enforcement of consistent priorities for the collection, analysis, 
and dissemination of intelligence throughout the Intelligence 
Community;”127 (2) “setting of policy and the ability to move 
personnel between elements of the Intelligence Community;”128 (3) 
“review, approval, modification, and primary management and 
oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community budgets”;129 
(4) “review, approval, modification, and primary management and 
oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community personnel 
and resource allocations”;130 (5) “review, approval, modification, 
and primary management and oversight of the execution of 
Intelligence Community research and development efforts”;131 (6) 
“review, approval, and coordination of relationships between the 
Intelligence Community agencies and foreign intelligence and law 
enforcement services”;132 and (7) “exercise of statutory authority to 
insure that Intelligence Community agencies and components 
fully comply with community-wide policy, management, spending, 
and administrative guidance and priorities.”133  The JIR, 
moreover, as part of the proposed establishment of this new super-
coordinating management czardom, suggests that “[t]o insure 
focused and consistent Intelligence Community leadership, 
Congress should require that no person may simultaneously serve 
as both the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency, or as the director of any other 
specific intelligence agency.”134
A second important proposal for statutory or budgetary 
changes suggested by the Joint Inquiry Report concerns a new 
national security institution.  According to the JIR: “Congress and 
the Administration should ensure the full development within the 
Department of Homeland Security of an effective all-source 
terrorism information fusion center”135 (IFC), with the goal that 
this novel organizational innovation “will dramatically improve 
the focus and quality of counterterrorism analysis and facilitate 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 2. 
 130. Id. at 3. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 3. 
 135. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
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the timely dissemination of relevant intelligence information, both 
within and beyond the boundaries of the Intelligence 
Community.”136  Despite its highfalutin name, the essential 
purpose of the “all-source terrorism information fusion center” 
appears to be the creation of a centralized intelligence agency.  
(Why, then, do we need both a CIA and an IFC?)137
The Joint Inquiry Report offers a third suggested statutory or 
budgetary action in the nature of oversight hearings.  The JIR 
states in this regard: 
The House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary 
Committees should continue to examine the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act and its implementation . . . 
particularly with respect to changes made as a result of 
 136. Id. 
 137. According to the JIR, the “information fusion center” (IFC) should be 
given legal authority and resources needed to: 
• have full and timely access to all counterterrorism-related 
intelligence information, including “raw” supporting data as 
needed; 
• have the ability to participate fully in the existing 
requirements process for tasking the Intelligence 
Community to gather information on foreign individuals, 
entities and threats; 
• integrate such information in order to identify and assess 
the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the United 
States in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities; 
• implement and fully utilize data mining and other advanced 
analytical tools, consistent with applicable law; 
• retain a permanent staff of experienced and highly skilled 
analysts, supplemented on a regular basis by personnel on 
“joint tours” from the various Intelligence Community 
agencies; 
• institute a reporting mechanism that enables analysts at all 
the intelligence and law enforcement agencies to post lead 
information for use by analysts at other agencies without 
waiting for dissemination of a formal report; 
• maintain excellence and creativity in staff analytic skills 
through regular use of analysis and language training 
programs; and 
• establish and sustain effective channels for the exchange of 
counterterrorism-related information with federal agencies 
outside the Intelligence Community as well as with state 
and local authorities. 
Id. at 5-6. 
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the USA PATRIOT Act and the subsequent decision of 
the United States Foreign Intelligence Court of Review, 
to determine whether its provisions adequately address 
present and emerging terrorist threats to the United 
States.  Legislation should be proposed by those 
Committees to remedy any deficiencies identified as a 
result of that review.138
As a fourth statutory or budgetary suggestion following up on 
other proposals for centralization and coordination,139 the JIR 
suggests that  “Congress should consider enacting legislation, 
modeled on the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, to instill the 
concept of ‘jointness’ throughout the Intelligence Community.”140  
As revealed in the supporting language of this recommendation, 
the JIR appears to be simply calling for more, good-old-fashioned 
American teamwork: 
By emphasizing such things as joint education, a joint 
career speciality, increased authority for regional 
commanders, and joint exercises [the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act of 1986] greatly enhanced the joint warfighting 
capabilities of the individual military services.  
Legislation to instill similar concepts throughout the 
Intelligence Community could help improve management 
of Community resources and priorities and insure a far 
more effective “team” effort by all the intelligence 
agencies.141
 138. Id. at 9-10. 
 139. See supra notes 124-38 and accompanying text. 
 140. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 11. 
 141. Id.  The JIR recommendation continues by stating: 
The Director of National Intelligence should require more extensive 
use of “joint tours” for intelligence and appropriate law enforcement 
personnel to broaden their experience and help bridge existing 
organizational and cultural divides through service in other 
agencies.  These joint tours should include not only service at 
Intelligence Community agencies, but also service in those agencies 
that are users or consumers of intelligence products.  Serious 
incentives for joint services should be established throughout the 
Intelligence Community and personnel should be rewarded for joint 
service with career advancement credit at individual agencies.  The 
Director of National Intelligence should also require Intelligence 
Community agencies to participate in joint exercises[.] 
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Fifth, the Joint Inquiry Report recommends expansion and 
improvement of “existing educational grant programs focused on 
intelligence-related fields, similar to military scholarship 
programs” as a statutory and budgetary measure.142
As a sixth statutory/budgetary suggestion, the JIR 
recommends that “Congress should . . . review the statutes, 
policies and procedures that govern the national security 
classification of intelligence information and its protection from 
unauthorized disclosure.”143  Interestingly, as part of this proposal, 
the JIR suggests that “[a]mong other matters, Congress should 
consider the degree to which excessive classification has been used 
in the past and the extent to which the emerging threat 
environment has greatly increased the need for real-time sharing 
of sensitive information.”144  What does “real-time sharing” mean?  
The most plausible interpretation appears to be the sharing of raw 
intelligence data as soon as it is reasonably made available.  
Another interpretation might be access to a web-based data source 
where new intelligence information is regularly updated and 
revised. 
Finally, the Joint Inquiry Report indicates, as a seventh 
statutory or budgetary modification to existing national 
intelligence and security laws: “as part of the confirmation process 
for Intelligence Community officials, Congress should require from 
those officials an affirmative commitment to the implementation 
and use of strong accountability mechanisms throughout the 
Intelligence Community.”145  The language “strong accountability 
mechanisms” reminds one of Orwellian-speak in his book 1984.146  
A draconian image that comes to mind is the kind of 
“accountability mechanism” practiced by Ian Fleming’s character, 
Goldfinger, when one of his agents has failed him—immediate 
electrocution and disposal.147  A less horrific “accountability 
mechanism” might simply include being fired from one’s job.  
Nonetheless, as usual, the JIR utilizes congressional jargon to 
Id. at 11-12. 
 142. Id. at 12. 
 143. Id. at 14. 
 144. Id. 
 145. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 15. 
 146. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Signet 1961) (1949). 
 147. See generally Ian Fleming’s classic book, GOLDFINGER (1959). 
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make its points. 
B.  Requested Reports from Executive Branch Agencies 
Numerous requests for reports are interwoven throughout the 
fabric of the Joint Inquiry Report’s recommendations.  First, the 
JIR wants the president to “take action to ensure that clear, 
consistent, and current priorities are established and enforced 
throughout the Intelligence Community,” and to make certain 
that “[o]nce established, these priorities” are “reviewed and 
updated” annually “to ensure that the allocation of Intelligence 
Community resources reflect and effectively address the 
continually evolving threat environment.”148  Under separation of 
powers principles, of course, Congress cannot command the 
president to undertake his independent constitutional powers as 
commander-in-chief149 or as leader of the nation’s conduct in 
foreign affairs,150 but the JIR apparently contemplates that 
Congress could obtain access to the aforementioned intelligence 
priorities information through Congress’ power of the purse:151 
“the establishment of Intelligence Community priorities…should 
be reported to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees [by 
the President] on an annual basis.”152
Second, the Joint Inquiry Report recommends a raft of reports 
from “the new Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney 
General, and the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security,” to be issued to both Congress and the President “on a 
date certain,” and containing four specific matters: (1) an account 
of “the FBI’s progress since September 11, 2001 in implementing 
the reforms required to conduct an effective domestic intelligence 
program,” including the “adequacy” of “domestic intelligence 
authorities” regarding the pursui[t] [of] counterterrorism at home 
and ensuring the protection of privacy and other rights 
guaranteed under the Constitution”;153 (2) an analysis of “the 
 148. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 3-4. 
 149. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 150. See id. at art. II, § 2, cls. 4-5. 
 151. See id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 152. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 4. 
 153. Id. at 8.  The JIR goes on to request, by way of a prominent example, 
executive branch proposals on “whether the range of persons subject to 
searches and surveillances authorized under the Foreign Intelligence 
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experience of other democratic nations in organizing the conduct 
of domestic intelligence”;154 (3) an appraisal of “the specific 
manner in which a new domestic intelligence service could be 
established in the United States, recognizing the need to enhance 
national security while fully protecting civil liberties”;155 and the 
somewhat repetitive request for a set of “recommendations on how 
to best fulfill the nation’s need for an effective domestic 
intelligence capability, including necessary legislation.”156
Third, the Joint Inquiry Report turns its attention to the 
NSA, presently lodged within the Department of Defense (DOD), 
seeking a “detailed plan,” by June 30, 2003, to the House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees, as well as to certain executive 
branch officials,157 which (1) describes solutions for the 
technological changes for signals intelligence; (2) requires a 
review, on a quarterly basis, of the goals, products to be delivered, 
funding levels and schedules for every technology development 
program; (3) ensures . . . accounting for program expenditures; (4) 
makes NSA a full collaborating partner with the CIA and the FBI 
in the war on terrorism, including fully integrating the collection 
and analytic capabilities of the NSA, CIA, and the FBI; and (5) 
makes recommendations for legislation needed to facilitate these 
goals.158
Fourth, the Joint Inquiry Report requests the State 
Department, “in consultation with the Department of Justice,” to 
report to both “the President and the Congress by June 30, 2003 
Surveillance Act (FISA) should be expanded.”  Id. 
 154. Id.  Comparative law perspectives are usually helpful in pondering 
the content and structure of legislation.  But query: have the domestic 
intelligence problems of the United States—the world’s sole “super-power” 
with the enmity of many groups from around the world—become sui generis?  
Perhaps the experience of Israel in conducting its domestic intelligence would 
be most apropos to the domestic intelligence program needed for the United 
States in the post 9/11 era. 
 155. Id. at 9. 
 156. Id. 
 157. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 10. 
 158. Id.  The language used by the JIR is ambiguous and open to varying 
interpretations.  As a final shot over the bow of NSA, the JIR in conjunction 
with the forthcoming requested report from NSA indicates as follows: “In 
evaluating the plan, the Committees should also consider issues pertaining to 
whether civilians should be appointed to the position of Director of National 
Security Agency and whether the term of service for the position should be 
longer than it has been in the recent past.”  Id. 
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on the extent to which revisions in bilateral and multilateral 
agreements, including extradition and mutual assistance treaties, 
would strengthen U.S. counterterrorism efforts.”159
Fifth, acknowledging the political reality of an independent 
investigative entity outside of the institutional structure of 
Congress brought about by the demands of relatives of 9/11 
victims,160 the JIR requests that this entity, “the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,” 
undertake “and make recommendations concerning how Congress 
may improve its oversight of the Intelligence Community,”161 
including the following five policy and legal issues: (1) “changes in 
the budgetary process”; (2) “changes in the rules regarding 
membership on the [intelligence] oversight committees”; (3) 
“whether oversight responsibility should be vested in a joint 
House-Senate Committee or, as currently exists, in separate 
Committees in each house”; (4) “the extent to which classification 
decisions impair congressional oversight”; and (5) “how 
Congressional oversight can best contribute to the continuing need 
of the Intelligence Community to evolve and adapt to changes in 
the subject matter of intelligence and the needs of 
 159. Id. at 13.  Interestingly, the JIR wants the State Department review 
to “address the degree to which current categories of extraditable offenses 
should be expanded to cover offenses, such as visa and immigration fraud, 
which may be particularly useful against terrorists and those who support 
them.”  Id. 
 160. See JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE THAN WATERGATE 113 (2004) (“Because of 
the lack of White House cooperation with the joint inquiry, the families of 
9/11 victims began lobbying Congress to create an independent commission, 
with subpoena power, to investigate 9/11, even before the congressional effort 
had been completed”).  Of course, the Joint Inquiry, acting through the 
respective houses of Congress, could have subpoenaed all pertinent 
documents that it wanted from the executive branch.  See LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESS 216-30 (Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane eds., 2d ed. 2002) (discussing 
compulsory process before congressional committees). 
 161. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 13.  In July of 2004 
the commission issued its report.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
This report “concluded in its unanimous final report . . . that the attacks were 
a shock but they should not have come as a surprise.”  Philip Shenon, We Are 
Not Safe: Commission Warns of Another Catastrophe Under Status Quo, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 23, 2004, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).  For an 
account of the formation of the Commission because of the perceived lack of 
success of the Joint Inquiry by Congress, see CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY 
INC., 2002 ALMANAC 7-18-7-19 (2003). 
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policymakers.”162
Sixth, concerned about what it perceived as the aggressive 
use of classified information by the executive branch during the 
course of its investigation—what Senator John McCain described 
as the administration having “slow-walked and stonewalled” the 
congressional inquiry163—the JIR makes the following remarkable 
request: 
the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with 
the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney 
General, should review and report to the House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees on proposals for a new 
and more realistic approach to the processes and 
structures that have governed the designation of sensitive 
and classified information.  The report should include 
proposals to protect against the use of the classification 
process as a shield to protect agency self-interest.164
Seventh, alarmed that the Intelligence Community had 
shrugged off responsibility for the terrorist attacks of September 
11, the Joint Inquiry Report sought a report from the CIA director 
“to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees no later than 
June 30, 2003” regarding “the steps taken to implement a system 
of accountability throughout the Intelligence Community, to 
include processes for identifying poor performance and affixing 
responsibility for it, and for recognizing and rewarding excellence 
in performance.”165
As an eighth, and final, mandate for executive branch 
reporting back to Congress, the JIR focused on the President: 
The Administration should review and report to the 
House and Senate Intelligence Committees by June 30, 
2003 regarding what progress has been made in reducing 
the inappropriate and obsolete barriers among 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies engaged in 
counterterrorism, what remains to be done to reduce 
those barriers, and what legislative actions may be 
 162. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 14. 
 163. DEAN, supra note 160. 
 164. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 15 (emphasis added). 
 165. Id. at 15. 
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advisable in that regard.  In particular, this report should 
address what steps are being taken to insure that 
perceptions within the Intelligence Community about the 
scope and limits of current law and policy with respect to 
restrictions on collection and information sharing are, in 
fact, accurate and well-founded.166
C.  Mandates for Executive Action 
The final category of congressional recommendations in the 
Joint Inquiry Report concerns suggestions (or demands) on 
executive branch agencies.  Ten calls for further executive action 
can be discerned in the JIR: 
• National Security Council-led and presidentially-approved 
“U.S. government-wide strategy for combating terrorism, 
both at home and abroad, including the growing terrorism 
threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and associated technologies” with components 
of the strategy to include “foreign policy, economic, 
military, intelligence, and law enforcement elements that 
are critical to a comprehensive blueprint for success in the 
war against terrorism”;167 
 166. Id. at 16.  In what may be called an omnibus reporting mandate, the 
following language appears at the close of the JIR’S recommendations: “The 
Intelligence Community should fully inform the House and Senate 
Intelligence Committees of significant developments [regarding evidence of 
state sponsored terrorism], through regular reports and additional 
communications” with the expectation that “the [congressional] Committees 
should, in turn, exercise vigorous and continuing oversight of the 
[Intelligence] Community’s work in this critically important area.”  Id. at 17. 
 167. Id. at 4.  The JIR goes on to specify how Congress would like this 
national counterterrorism strategy to look including discussion of the 
following: 
• develop[ing] human sources to penetrate terrorist 
organizations and networks both overseas and within the 
United States; 
• fully utilize[ing] existing and future technologies to better 
exploit terrorist communications; to improve and expand 
the use of data mining and other cutting edge analytical 
tools; and to develop a multi-level security capability to 
facilitate the timely and complete sharing of relevant 
intelligence information both within the Intelligence 
Community and with other appropriate federal, state, and 
local authorities; 
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• The creation of a “National Intelligence Officer for 
Terrorism” within the “National Intelligence Council” who 
would be “a highly qualified individual appointed to 
prepare intelligence estimates on terrorism for the use of 
Congress” and executive branch policymakers”;168 
 
• The implementation, by the FBI, of multiple measures to 
improve the Bureau’s conducting of domestic intelligence 
by: better prioritization and enforcement of field office 
compliance, developing independent career tracks for 
counterterrorism, better training of strategic analysts, 
establishing “a strong reports officer cadre at the FBI 
Headquarters” to ensure better dissemination of agents to 
analysts of key counterterrorism information, agent 
training for better use of strategic analysis, recruitment of 
agents with needed linguistic skills, increased penetration 
of terrorist organizations operating within the United 
States through “all available means of collection,” 
improved “national security law training” by FBI 
personnel, improved exchange of counterterrorism 
information between the FBI and other federal, state and 
local agencies, and remediation of “the FBI’s persistent 
and incapacitating information technology problems”;169 
 
• enhance[ing] the depth and quality of domestic intelligence 
collection and analysis by, for example, modernizing current 
intelligence reporting formats through the use of existing 
information technology to emphasize the existence and the 
significance of links between new and previously acquired 
information; 
• maximize[ing] the effective use of covert action in 
counterterrorist efforts; 
• develop[ing] programs to deal with financial support for 
international terrorism; and 
• facilitate[ing] the ability of CIA paramilitary units and 
military special operations forces to conduct joint operations 
against terrorist targets. 
Id. at 4-5. 
 168. Id. at 5. 
 169. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 7-8. 
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• The accomplishment by the Attorney General and the 
Director of the FBI of expanded and improved intelligence 
data obtained by an aggressive use of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act;170 
 
• Transformation by the Intelligence Community led by the 
Director of National Intelligence, of the “recruitment and 
development of a workforce with the intelligence skills and 
expertise needed for success in counterterrorist efforts.”171  
Greatly enhanced training programs should be launched 
and carried out in the following areas: “information 
sharing among law enforcement and intelligence 
personnel; language capabilities; the use of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act; and watchlisting”;172 
 
• Review and improvement under the direction of the 
President, of the budgeting process of implementing 
American counterterrorism policy including “consideration 
of a separate classified Intelligence Community budget,” 
flexible appropriations “subject to congressional oversight, 
to enable the Intelligence Community to rapidly respond to 
altered or unanticipated needs”; and contracting for a 
“rigorous cost-benefit analysis of the resources spent on 
intelligence”;173 
 
• Consideration by the President of possible amendments to 
“Executive Orders, policies and procedures that govern the 
 170. See id. at 9. 
 171. Id. at 10. 
 172. Id. at 11.  One of the more intriguing specific congressional 
recommendations is a “Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps” outside of the 
Intelligence Community “whose abilities are relevant to the needs of 
counterterrorism[.]”  Id.  Moreover, ever “politically correct” in its aspirations, 
the JIR directs that: 
the Intelligence Community should enhance recruitment of a more 
ethnically and culturally diverse workforce and devise a strategy to 
capitalize upon the unique culture and linguistic capabilities of first-
generation Americans, a strategy designed to utilize their skills to 
the greatest practical effect, while recognizing the potential 
counterintelligence challenges such hiring decisions might pose. 
Id. at 12. 
 173. Id. at 12-13. 
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national security classification of intelligence information” 
with an eye toward “expand[ing] access to relevant 
information for federal agencies outside the Intelligence 
Community, for state and local authorities, which are 
critical to the fight against terrorism, and for the American 
public,” while also reassessing existing presidential policy 
“to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of classified 
intelligence information”;174 
 
• Reviews by the “Inspectors General at the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the 
Department of Justice, and the Department of State” of the 
factual findings of the JIR, coupled with further 
independent internal reviews, “to determine whether and 
to what extent personnel at all levels should be held 
accountable for any omission, commission, or failure to 
meet professional standards” dealing with “the 
identification, prevention, or disruption of terrorist 
attacks, including the events of September 11, 2001”;175 
 
• Development, under direction of the President, of “a 
national watch list center that will be responsible for 
integrating all terrorist-related watch list systems,” while 
“ensuring a consistent and comprehensive flow of terrorist 
names into the center from all relevant points of 
collection”;176 
 
• FBI and CIA coordination and “aggressive[e]” investigation 
of “the possibility that foreign governments are providing 
support to or are involved in terrorist activity targeting the 
United States and U.S. interests.”177 
V.  ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF JOINT INQUIRY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 
A remarkable aspect of the Joint Inquiry Report is the 
inclusion of some 190 pages of “[a]dditional views.”178  While the 
 174. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 14. 
 175. Id. at 15-16. 
 176. Id. at 16. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, following page 435.  The 
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use of additional views in congressional committee reports is well 
known,179 their significance is under-theorized.  Are they in the 
nature of judicial dissenting or concurring opinions?180  Are they 
mere grandstanding?  A review of some of the eight separate 
additional views filed by nine members181 of the Joint Inquiry will 
touch on these questions.  In general, taken as a whole and 
considered together, these additional views highlight the multi-
flawed legal process of the Joint Inquiry. 
A.  Senator Richard C. Shelby 
The most prominent of the additional views of the members of 
the Joint Inquiry is the filing of Senator Richard C. Shelby (R-AL).  
The prominence of Shelby’s additional views is premised on two 
reasons: (1) he is Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence,182 and (2) his views are spread out over 135 
“additional views” are separately paginated.  See id.  Citation will be to the 
separately titled, separately paginated authors’ additional views.  See infra 
notes 185, 204, 206, 222, 225. 
 179. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, supra note 160, at 284-85. 
 180. Cf. Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. 
Posner’s First Decade Dissenting Judicial Opinions, 1981-1991—Toward An 
Aesthetics of Judicial Dissenting Style, 69 MO. L. REV. 73 (2004).  See also 
CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003). 
 181. The additional views of members are as follows and appear in the 
following order: 
• Senator Richard C. Shelby (R-AL) (135 pages) 
• Representative Michael N. Castle (R-DE) (2 pages) 
• Senator Mike DeWine (R-OH) (16 pages) 
• Representative Jane Harman (D-CA) (5 pages) 
• Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Sen. Pat Roberts (R-KS) (21 
pages) 
• Senator Carl Levin (D-MN) (3 pages) 
• Senator Barbara A. Mikulski (D-MD) (3 pages) 
• Representative Tim Roemer (D-IN) (5 pages) 
See JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, (separately paginated additional 
views attached to the JIR). A total of seventeen U.S. Senators and members 
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence were part of the Joint Inquiry.  
See id. at viii.  A total of twenty U.S. Representatives and members of the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence were part of the Joint 
Inquiry.  See id. at ix. Therefore, nine out of thirty-seven (or about twenty-
four percent) of the Joint Inquiry members filed additional views. 
 182. See id. at viii. 
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pages.183  Moreover, in a recent book, Shelby was quoted as saying 
this about the difficulty encountered in obtaining information 
during the Joint Inquiry: “You know, we were told that there 
would be cooperation in this investigation and I question that,” 
noting, “I think that most of the information that our staff has 
been able to get [from the executive branch] has had to be 
extracted piece by piece.”184
Shelby’s additional views contain several acerbic nuggets.  
First, drawing a historical parallel between the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001 and the “devastating surprise attack the 
United States suffered at Japanese hands at Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941,” Shelby urges the case for fundamental reform, 
stating that “too much has happened for us to be able to conclude 
that the American people and our national security interests can 
be protected simply by throwing more resources at agencies still 
fundamentally wedded to the pre-September 11 status quo.”185
Second, speaking of the structure and organization of the 
American Intelligence Community, Shelby lambasts the Director 
of Central Intelligence’s “at least partly rhetorical 1998 
declaration of ‘war’ against Al Qaeda,” and criticizes “the 
centrifugal tendencies of bureaucratic politics” within the 
Intelligence Community with the upshot that the Community 
“responds too slowly and too disjointedly to shifting threats.”186  In 
this regard, he urges “organizational flexibility”187 and “a 
 183. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 184. DEAN, supra note 160, at 113 (footnote omitted). 
 185. SEN. RICHARD C. SHELBY, SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE IMPERATIVE OF 
REFORM IN THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR 
RICHARD C. SHELBY, VICE CHAIRMAN, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
INTELLIGENCE 3 (Dec. 10, 2002) [hereinafter SHELBY]. 
 186. Id. at 4.  In partial support of his reference to centrifugal tendencies, 
Shelby observed: “The most obvious problem with respect to the IC’s 
[Intelligence Committee’s] ability to act as a coherent and effective whole is 
the fact that more than 80 percent of its budgets and personnel resources are 
controlled by the Department of Defense (DOD).”  Id. at 4. 
 187. Id. at 28.  He elaborated on this point by observing: 
This is what might be called the “meta-lesson” of our current round 
of “lessons learned” studies of intelligence failures: we must not only 
learn the lessons of the past but learn how to keep learning lessons 
as we change and adapt in the future.  Adopting uniform personnel 
standards would help the Community ensure that its personnel and 
organizational units remain unique and valuable individual 
resources but they would also become administratively fungible 
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continual process of ‘creative destruction’ not unlike competitive 
corporate approaches used in the private sector.”188
Third, focusing on information-sharing concerns, Shelby goes 
to considerable lengths in his additional views to critique the 
Intelligence Community’s failure to “connect the dots” before 
9/11;189 to describe the systemic and continual problems of 
information within the Intelligence Community;190 and to 
enthusiastically encourage future breakthroughs in innovative 
techniques of information sharing.191  Highlighting the paramount 
intelligence sharing failures that he believes the Joint Inquiry’s 
investigation revealed, Shelby opines at length: 
The CIA’s chronic failure, before September 11, to share 
with other agencies the names of known al-Qa’ida 
terrorists who it knew to be in the country allowed at 
least two such terrorists the opportunity to live, move, 
and prepare for the attacks without hindrance from the 
very federal officials whose job it is to find them.  Sadly, 
the CIA seems to have concluded that the maintenance of 
its information monopoly was more important tha[n] 
stopping terrorists from entering or operating within the 
United States.  Nor did the FBI fare much better, for even 
when notified in the so-called “Phoenix Memo” of the 
danger of al-Qa’ida flight school training, its agents failed 
to understand or act upon this information in the broader 
context of information the FBI already possessed about 
terrorist efforts to target or use U.S. civil aviation.  The 
CIA watchlisting and FBI Phoenix stories illustrate both 
the potential of sophisticated information-sharing and 
good information-empowered analysis and the perils of 
failing to share information promptly and efficiently 
between (and within) organizations.  They demonstrate 
the need to ensure that intelligence analysis is conducted 
on a truly “all-source” basis by experts permitted to 
assets, capable of being reorganized and redirected efficiently as 
circumstances demand. 
Id. 
 188. Id. at 29. 
 189. Id. at 33-46. 
 190. SHELBY, supra note 185, at 47-51. 
 191. Id. at 52-70. 
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access all relevant information—no matter where in the 
IC [Intelligence Community] it happens to reside.192
Fourth, Senator Shelby’s additional views raise some useful 
points about intelligence-law enforcement coordination.  “The 
September 11 story,” as he puts it, “illustrates the tremendous 
problems of coordination between U.S. law enforcement and 
intelligence entities that developed out of a long series of 
misunderstandings, timorous lawyering, and mistaken 
assumptions.”193  Even after 9/11 and the passage of the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001,194 which amended the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA),195 Shelby expresses frustrations that “[i]t 
took over a year . . . for the USA PATRIOT Act changes to 
penetrate the U.S. Government’s entrenched ‘no coordination’ 
bureaucratic culture.”196  Furthermore, in Shelby’s view, “[i]t was 
not until November 2002 that the FISA Court of Review—the 
never before-used appellate body created by the statute—issued 
an opinion” overruling the FISA trial court that “the law . . . 
stands today where Congress intended it to stand” in passing the 
USA PATRIOT Act in October 2001: “there is no restriction upon 
coordination between law enforcement and intelligence organs in 
connection with FISA surveillance or physical searches, and such 
activity can lawfully be undertaken even if primarily done with 
prosecutorial intent, provided that a ‘significant’ intelligence 
purpose remains.”197
Fifth, in strong language of rebuke, Senator Shelby castigates 
the domestic intelligence failures of the FBI leading up to 
September 11, 2001, concluding that the FBI’s “organizational and 
institutional culture is terribly flawed,” and that the FBI “is 
fundamentally incapable, in its present form, of providing 
Americans with the security they require against foreign terrorist 
and intelligence threats.”198
 192. Id. at 6-7. 
 193. Id. at 8. 
 194. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 252 (Oct. 26, 2001). 
 195. 18 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq. (Supp. 2005). 
 196. SHELBY, supra note 185, at 86. 
 197. Id. at 89 (footnote omitted). 
 198. Id. at 10.  He went on to contend: 
In light of the FBI’s dismal recent history of disorganization and 
institutional incompetence in its national security work, many of us 
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Sixth, Shelby’s take on the CIA’s pre-9/11 human intelligence 
performance is caustic.  As he sees it, the CIA “has been too 
reluctant to develop non-traditional” forms of human-collected 
intelligence and “has stuck too much and for too long with the 
comparatively easy work of operating under diplomatic cover from 
U.S. embassies.”199
Seventh, regarding the topic of covert action, Senator Shelby 
comments: 
[G]iven the unpleasant history of covert action scandals 
that have affected the CIA, one should not be surprised to 
find that—ironically, perhaps—the covert action 
infrastructure is a relatively cautious one.  Intelligence 
officers will often, and with good reason, hesitate to take 
operational risks or to push aggressively to accomplish 
their missions if they are operating under ambiguous or 
convoluted legal authorities and always suspect that they 
may be prosecuted or hauled before a hostile inquiry for 
any actual or perceived missteps.200
Finally, Shelby offers separate remarks to the Joint Inquiry 
Report on the subject of accountability, “respectfully disagree[ing]” 
with the view, offered by some officials, that Congress “should 
postpone holding anyone accountable within the Intelligence 
Community until [the] war against al-Qa’ida is completed.”201  As 
Shelby puts it: “Precisely because we face a grave and ongoing 
threat, we must begin reforming the [Intelligence] Community 
in Congress have begun to consider whether it might better serve the 
interests of the American people to separate the counterintelligence 
and counterterrorism functions of the [FBI] into an entirely separate 
organization—one that would be free of the structural, 
organizational, and cultural constraints that have greatly 
handicapped the FBI’s ability to conduct the domestic intelligence 
work our country depends upon it to perform. 
Id.  at 98-99. 
 199. Id. at 12. 
 200. Id. at 129.  A significant reason for this covert action timidity, from 
Shelby’s perspective, was a history, during the Clinton Administration, of 
legal authorizations contained in presidential Memoranda of Notifications 
(MONs) “as to what [covert] agents are permitted to do in pursuit of the 
stated aim—with absolute clarity.”  Id. (footnote citing Joint Inquiry 
testimony of former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger). 
 201. SHELBY, supra note 185, at 13. 
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immediately.”202  Speaking in a voice of agitated dissent, Shelby 
employs understated outrage in the failure of the Joint Inquiry to 
assess specific blame for the 9/11 disaster: 
The metaphor of “war” is instructive, for wise generals do 
not hesitate to hold their subordinates accountable while 
the battle still rages, disciplining or cashiering those who 
fail to do their duty.  So also do wise Presidents dispose of 
their faltering generals under fire.  Indeed, failures in 
wartime are traditionally considered less excusable, and 
are punished more severely, than failures in times of 
peace. 
Nor should we forget that accountability has two sides.  It 
is also a core responsibility of all good leaders to reward 
those who perform well, and promote them to positions of 
ever greater responsibility. 
* * * 
For these reasons, it is disappointing to me that despite 
the Joint Inquiry’s explicit mandate to “lay a basis for 
assessing the accountability of institutions and officials of 
government” and despite its extensive findings 
documenting recurring and widespread [Intelligence] 
Community shortcomings in the months and years 
leading up to September 11, the Joint Inquiry has not 
seen fit to identify any of the individuals whose decisions 
left us so unprepared.  I urge President Bush to examine 
the Joint Inquiry’s findings in order to determine the 
extent to which he has been well served by his “generals” 
in the Intelligence Community.203
B.  Representative Mike Castle 
Representative Mike Castle (R-DE) filed the functional 
equivalent of a short concurring opinion to the Joint Inquiry 
Report, focusing on two issues that he sought to highlight: (1) the 
need for significant improvement in the performance of the NSA 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 13-14. 
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in obtaining better signal intelligence concerning global terrorism, 
and (2) the need for substantial, immediate reform “with respect 
to the management, coordination and oversight of our Nation’s 
visa program.”204
Castle’s more telling comments concern the matter of visa 
reform.  Alarmingly, as he explains: 
The majority of the September 11th hijackers were 
wrongly admitted to the United States—in violation of 
U.S. immigration laws—as a result of decisions made and 
errors committed by responsible State Department and 
Justice Department officers.  The fact that many of them 
entered and operated in true name, further emphasizes 
the extent to which the current system is broken.205
C.  Senator Mike DeWine 
Senator Mike DeWine (R-OH) crafted his separate remarks in 
the form of a partial concurring opinion and partial dissent from 
the Joint Inquiry Report.206 Even on those few points where he 
seems to be going against the grain of the JIR, DeWine’s 
dissenting comments are collaborative in nature.207
DeWine makes seven key arguments.  First, he asserts that it 
was vital for the Intelligence Committees of Congress to “improve 
the quality and quantity of oversight” with regard to executive 
branch agencies seeking secret authorization pursuant to FISA to 
conduct domestic intelligence.208
 204. REPRESENTATIVE MIKE CASTLE, ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE 
MIKE CASTLE (R-DELEWARE) TO BE APPENDED TO THE REPORT OF THE JOINT 
INQUIRY ON THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED 
STATES 1 (Dec. 2002). 
 205. Id. at 1-2. 
 206. See SENATOR MIKE DEWINE, ADDITIONAL COMMENTS JOINT INQUIRY 
STAFF REPORT 1 (Dec. 18, 2002) [hereinafter DEWINE]. 
 207. Id. at 2.  Cf. Blomquist, supra note 180, at 91-92 (discussing the 
concept of a collaborative versus an oppositional judicial dissenting opinion). 
 208. DEWINE, supra note 206, at 2.  Senator DeWine’s suggestions for 
additional congressional oversight activities are incisive and perspicacious.  
He proposes, for example: 
[T]he Intelligence Committees [of Congress] should hold regularly 
scheduled hearings to examine the FISA process and receive 
testimony from senior [executive branch] officials . . . .  These 
hearings should explore the FISA process and provide information as 
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Second, in an intriguing proposal, DeWine suggests the need 
for improving the FISA process by requiring the appointment, by 
the secret court administering the statute, of “advocates” chosen 
from a group of “pre-cleared attorneys with prior FISA 
experience”209 who, while not contacting or informing “the subject 
of the potential surveillance,” would, instead, “act as officers of the 
[secret] court, representing the legal position in opposition to the 
Justice Department’s application for a FISA warrant.”210
Third, Senator DeWine parts company with the JIR’s 
recommendation to create a separate position of Director of 
National Intelligence, untethered from the CIA, observing that a 
number of experts had concluded that this institutional isolation 
would be “counterproductive.”211   Fourth, he urges the need to 
emphasize that “the Intelligence Community needs to pay more 
attention to the collection and analysis of open-source 
information” derived from available unclassified information—
such as a report, written in 1999, by a Library of Congress analyst 
regarding the risk of Al Qaeda suicide bombers flying airplanes 
into places like the White House and the Pentagon.212
Fifth, DeWine opines that the “Senate and House Intelligence 
Committees are asking for too many unnecessary reports” from 
members of the Intelligence Community.213
Sixth, he offers an innovative potential technique to enhance 
information-sharing among members of the sprawling and diverse 
to how FISA is being implemented.  For example, in order to better 
determine how the Executive Branch is utilizing FISA, the 
Committee should examine the number of FISA warrants issued 
during a given period of time and the general subject matter or 
issues those warrants were meant to address.  Furthermore, these 
hearings should be used to explore a wide range of hypothetical 
situations—situations based on actual cases that demonstrate to 
[Congress] . . . how the law would be applied in certain scenarios.  
This would allow [Congress] to develop a better understanding of 
how FISA is being implemented in a practical, day-to-day manner 
and also alert [Congress] to any instances where the [relevant 
intelligence entities are] departing from Congressional intent. 
Id. at 3. 
 209. Id. at 4. 
 210. Id. at 4 n.2. 
 211. Id. at 5. 
 212. Id. at 6. 
 213. DEWINE, supra note 206, at 6. 
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American Intelligence Community.214  According to DeWine: 
A relatively simple way to address this would be through 
the use of a technology known as “multi-level security” 
capability.  Basically, the use of multi-level security 
allows computer users with different levels of security 
classification to get different levels of access to 
information contained and stored in a comprehensive 
intelligence database.  In other words, database users 
would be able to access only the information in the 
database that their security clearances allowed them to 
view. 
This would allow the myriad of intelligence agencies to 
safely combine all of their databases, including those 
containing the most sensitive data and make the entire 
combined database accessible to a wide range of 
intelligence and law enforcement personnel, without 
sacrificing security for the most highly classified data.  
For example, a detective in Cincinnati who notices 
unusual activity around city hall could do a search of the 
comprehensive Community-wide database for “city halls 
in Ohio” and come up with some non-classified FBI 
information about possible attacks on city halls around 
the state or in other states.  He then would get a 
notification from the system that there was more 
information about the topic, but that it was classified at a 
level above his clearance.  At that point, he could go to his 
supervisor and begin the process of having that 
information sent to someone within the department who 
has the appropriate level of clearance.  This would help 
resolve one of the many information-sharing problems 
facing the Intelligence Community.215
Finally, Senator DeWine’s separate filing contains a 
thoughtful and in-depth scenario for changing the existing 
American Intelligence Community’s “[b]roken [c]orporate 
[c]ulture,” which is risk-averse, rather than prudently risk-
 214. Id. at 7. 
 215. Id.  An obvious potential problem with this particular idea, however, 
is securing the combined intelligence database against computer hackers. 
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taking.216  From his perspective: “A new organization must be 
built from the ground up as a small, agile, and adaptive 
organization with a corporate culture of taking prudent risks.”217  
Moreover, it would have a limited list of targets: terrorists, 
proliferators, and ‘rogue states.’” 218  And its operations, according 
to DeWine, would emphasize “non-official operations or NOC’s” 219 
unaffiliated with any official U.S. government “cover” job220 and 
operating over long stretches of time with considerable 
autonomy.221
D.  Representative Jane Harman 
Representative Jane Harman (D-CA) offers a few nuggets of 
concurring insights which enlarge on the Joint Inquiry Report.  
First, she points out that the JIR recommendation for creating a 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) would “empower” this 
official “to lead the [Intelligence Community] by pairing authority 
with responsibility.”222  By way of comparison, Harman points out 
that the Director of Central Intelligence “currently lacks the 
statutory authority” to provide “a coherent approach across 
agencies and overarching leadership.” 223
Second, offering a lighter touch than the tone of the Joint 
Inquiry Report, Representative Harman opines that while “[t]he 
investigation revealed that significant intelligence leads about 
some of the hijackers were available but did not get widely 
shared,” this lapse “was less a willful refusal to share information 
than it was a failure to grasp its significance.” 224
 216. Id. at 8. 
 217. Id. 
 218. DEWINE, supra note 208, at 8. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See id. at 8-15.  As explained by DeWine, this might include 
attendance at a radical Islamic mosque in the U.S., allowing the American 
operative to travel abroad, receiving training at a terrorist camp and to 
“infiltrate organizations like al Qaeda.”  Id. at 14. 
 222. REPRESENTATIVE JANE HARMAN, JOINT INQUIRY REPORT ADDITIONAL 
VIEWS 1 (December 2002). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 2.  In this regard, she went on to note that the “raw databases” 
of many American intelligence agencies like the CIA and the NSA “contain 
extremely valuable information that does not get noticed, shared, integrated, 
or acted upon.”  Id. 
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E.  Senator Jon Kyl & Senator Pat Roberts 
In what is, in effect, a joint dissenting opinion from the JIR, 
Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Pat Roberts (R-KS) divide their 
concerns into three major headings: (1) “[t]he [n]eed for 
[a]dditional [v]iews,” 225 (2) “[d]efficiencies in the [r]eport,” 226 and 
(3) “[c]omments on [r]ecommendations.” 227
1.  A Perspective on Process 
We gain a valuable insider’s peek on the Joint Inquiry process 
from the perspective of two relatively junior and conservative U.S. 
Senators.  They begin their dissenting statement with a lament 
about how the content of the Joint Inquiry Report was assembled.  
Thus, by examining their opening salvo, we can discern that they 
were displeased with the way the staff and the combined 
committee’s leadership controlled things.  They complain: 
The Report is a product of the Joint Inquiry Staff (JIS), 
not the Senators and the Representatives who sit, 
respectively, on the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).  The Chairman and 
Vice Chairman of the SSCI and the Chairman and 
Ranking Member of the HPSCI (the “Big Four”) made 
most decisions and supervised the JIS.  The JIS should be 
commended for putting together the first official account 
of events leading up to the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001. 
It is difficult, however, for rank-and-file Members of the 
two Committees to know how thorough or accurate the 
Report is because of the way the JIS and the “Big Four” 
conducted the inquiry, withholding information and 
decisions from the Members and SSCI and HPSCI staff 
throughout the process.  While the Report should be a 
useful historical document on which to base further 
 225. SENATOR JON KYL & SENATOR PAT ROBERTS, JOINT INQUIRY STAFF 
REPORT ADDITIONAL VIEWS 1 (December 2002) [hereinafter KYL & ROBERTS]. 
 226. Id. at 4. 
 227. Id. at 20. 
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inquiries, we cannot vouch for its contents. 228
A second process-pique of Kyl and Roberts is that reasons why 
mistakes were made by the Intelligence Community were not 
emphasized.  They note: 
After prodding by several Senators, some underlying 
causes of these failures were identified, but even then, 
they were not further probed to determine what might 
have been done differently.  And the fact that the 
prodding was necessary illustrates our concern that the 
JIS either ran out of time or did not have the inclination 
or instruction to examine, for instance, why U.S. 
government agencies were risk-averse, who is responsible 
for the inadequate resources devoted to counter-terrorism 
efforts, why legal authorities were so confusing, and why 
leadership was so lacking.  Without this examination, the 
Report will be of limited value in determining “lessons 
learned.” 229
Fascinating stuff!  But there is more process vitriol. 
Third, Senators Kyl and Roberts groused that the Joint 
Inquiry process “was conducted and overseen in a way that left 
rank-and-file members at a distinct disadvantage, and left 
insufficient time to examine many relevant issues.”230  In this 
regard, they grumble that the voluminous final draft of the JIR 
“was delivered to Members four days before the one and only 
meeting scheduled for its consideration, when most Members were 
out of town.” 231 Moreover, they gripe that “[t]here was no debate 
about the Report, only the Recommendations.  But there was little 
basis for debate since the product was strictly the work of the 
JIS—more like an Inspector General’s report than a typical 
congressional committee report.”232  Roberts and Kyl provide 
numerous details of what they perceived to be serious defects in 
the Joint Inquiry process that were labeled by the senators as 
“irregularities.” 233  These included the following: 
 228. Id. at 1. 
 229. Id. 
 230. KYL & ROBERTS, supra note 225, at 1-2. 
 231. Id. at 2. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
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• “Upon instructions from the Chairmen—and in violation of 
SSCI rules—the JIS often failed to tell Members and staff 
of important non-compartmented information it discovered 
in a timely manner.”234 
 
• “Information relating to open hearings—such as the JIS 
staff statement and witness statements—were routinely 
provided only late on the night before the hearing.”235 
 
• “Committee staff and sometimes even the staff directors, 
were often excluded from meetings of the “Big Four”, whose 
decisions were often made without consultation.  Members’ 
liaison staff, and, therefore, the Members themselves, were 
in the dark about these decisions.”236 
 
A fourth key process failure noted by the joint separate 
statement of Senators Kyl and Roberts deals with the holding of 
open hearings by the Joint Inquiry during the Autumn of 2002.  
As extensively explained by these gentlemen: 
The holding of open hearings was particularly 
frustrating.  The decision to hold them was apparently 
made by the “Big Four” despite the concerns of the JIS 
and objections of other Senators.  The JIS was forced to 
focus on them for three months, and from there had to go 
right into drafting the Report in order to meet the year-
end deadline. 
Several Members voiced their opposition to holding open 
hearings before the investigative work was completed and 
the Report written (and, we had supposed agreed to).  We 
objected, mostly in closed committee business meetings, 
that it was premature to convene open hearings before 
the investigation was complete.  And indeed, at the point 
when the JIS began preparing for them (July, 2002), its 
investigations into the causes of 9/11 largely ground to a 
halt.  Due to dramatic media leaks and the potential for 
 234. Id. 
 235. KYL & ROBERTS, supra note 225, at 2. 
 236. Id. 
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further compromise, intelligence agencies “pushed back” 
against open hearings, causing further friction with the 
JIS investigation. 
The hearings distracted these agencies, our “front line 
troops” on the war on terrorism, and they distracted 
Members and congressional staff from our traditional 
oversight responsibilities.  They also, in our view . . . 
publicly revealed a lot of sensitive information from 
which our enemies could profit.  Most of the information 
presented had already been revealed in closed hearings 
which were far more productive because those who 
participated could delve freely into classified information. 
Key figures in our counter-terrorism efforts were 
unnecessarily compromised by these public hearings.  
* * * 
We should have been more circumspect about publicly 
releasing results before the investigation was complete 
and the two intelligence committees had had a chance to 
adequately review the final Report.237
2.  Claimed Deficiencies in the JIR 
Senators Kyl and Roberts explicitly link the previously-
discussed process failures238 to a resulting substantive 
Congressional report “that falls well short of addressing the core 
problems that led to 9/11.” 239  They confidently assert in support 
of this conclusion: “Because the fundamental problems that led to 
9/11 are almost certainly rooted in poor policy and inadequate 
leadership, the investigation should have delved more deeply into 
conflicting interpretations of legal authorities (including 
presidential directives), budget allocations, institutional attitudes, 
and other key areas.” 240  As they explain in other words, “only 
such a thorough exercise will help us to make sure the failures [of 
 237. Id. at 3-4. 
 238. See supra notes 228-37 and accompanying text. 
 239. KYL & ROBERTS, supra note 225, at 4. 
 240. Id. 
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American counterterrorism policy] are not repeated.”241  
Continuing to build on this assertion, the two senators observe 
that “[w]hat best shows the tendency of the JIS investigations to 
go to the water’s edge but no farther is that, in the Report, there is 
a pronounced tendency to identify problems as ‘facts,’ or ‘realities,’ 
rather than as matters to be plumbed for underlying causes.” 242  
The example provided here is staff analysis that does not dig for 
the root causes of why the CIA did not make efforts to penetrate 
terrorist havens in Afghanistan and why the Pentagon did not 
attempt a “comprehensive response” to the terrorist bombings of 
American embassies in Africa in 1998 or the bombing of the U.S.S. 
Cole in 2000.243
The additional views of Senators Kyl and Roberts highlight 
five additional substantive deficiencies of the Joint Inquiry Report 
analysis and discussion: (a) “[r]isk [a]version,” 244 (b) “[i]nsufficient 
[r]esources,245 (c) “[a] [f]lawed [l]egal/[i]nstitutional  
[f]ramework,246 (d) “[l]eadership [f]ailures,247 and (e) the 
“[i]nadequate [s]cope” 248 of the JIR. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 4-5. 
 244. KYL & ROBERTS, supra note 225, at 5-8 (discussing a “legacy of 
caution” at key American intelligence agencies dealing with official concern 
about past congressional criticisms of civil liberties violations and a cultural 
ethos that was afraid to make mistakes). 
 245. Id. at 8-13 (discussing the “contradiction between high-ranking 
officials’ complaints about inadequate resources and the fact that, according 
to the Office Management and Budget, the intelligence agencies usually got 
what they asked for”). 
 246. Id. at 13-15 (criticizing ambiguous legal materials from presidential 
decision directives to the FISA statute). 
 247. Id. at 15-17.  They note:  
al Qaeda’s attack on Washington and New York occurred after a long 
period of poor leadership at the highest levels of the U.S. 
Government regarding terrorism.  Despite repeated assaults on the 
United States and its interests—the 1993 World Trade Center 
attack, the bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania in 1998, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, to name a 
few—the U.S. Government was still unwilling to treat terrorism as a 
true national security issue until 9/11. 
Id. 
 248. Id. at 17-20 (criticizing the failure of the JIR to fully discuss the 
failure of the U.S. State Department to deny visa access by 15 of the 19 
hijackers from Saudi Arabia). 
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3.  Criticism of JIR Recommendations 
The Kyl-Roberts statement closes with two specific criticisms 
of the JIR recommendations and a general summary criticism of 
the failing of the JIR process.  First, they dismiss the notion that 
an “intelligence czar” would be able to “succeed where the Director 
of Central Intelligence has not.” 249  Second, they object to the 
Joint Inquiry Report’s recommendation “calling for lower-level 
personnel to be held accountable by the various agencies’ 
Inspectors General” instead of pursuing “[a]ccountability of those 
at the very top” which would, in turn, “produce[ ] accountability at 
the intervening levels, and among officers in the field who run 
down leads to find terrorists.” 250  Finally, Senators Kyl and 
Roberts conclude: “Our duty to understand precedes our ability to 
improve.  The [JIR], in not fully coming to terms with what 
produced the intelligence failures it identified, left that duty 
unfulfilled.”251
VI. CONGRESS AND THE ART OF OVERSIGHT OF COUNTERTERRORISM 
POLICY 
A.  Congress’ Constitutional Role of Executive Oversight 
Relatively little has been written on Congress’ constitutional 
responsibility to oversee the executive branch.  Most 
commentators who have considered the subject have focused on 
the need to counterbalance the extraordinary power of the 
President and his executive branch officials in implementing and 
interpreting laws passed by Congress, the responsibility of 
Congress to assure that publicly appropriated funds are spent 
wisely and effectively and according to the intent of Congress, and 
the salutary effects of publicizing government operations in a free 
society. 252
Oversight by Congress of executive branch operations stems 
 249. KYL & ROBERTS, supra note 225, at 20. 
 250. Id. at 21. 
 251. Id. 
 252. For an excellent discussion of the constitutional and interactive 
problems of the congressional oversight of the executive branch, see WILLIAM 
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRET, LEGISLATION AND 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 203-10 (2000). 
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from the broad constitutional grant of “[a]ll legislative powers” to 
Congress,253 made more specific by the interconnected all-
encompassing web of Article I, Sections 8 and 9 powers dealing 
with the funding and structuring of executive activities.254
B.  The Lost Art of Congressional Oversight 
While the tradition of vigorous congressional oversight of 
executive branch operations goes back in time more than 200 
years,255 in recent decades there has been an “erosion of Congress’ 
 253. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1. 
 254. Id. at art. I, § 8, art. I § 9. 
 255. David Nather, Congress As Watchdog: Asleep on the Job?, 62 CONG. 
QUART. WKLY 1190, 1190-93 (May 22, 2004).  Prominent instances of past 
congressional oversight investigations include: the 1792 inquiry on the 
Indian attacks on American troops—the first congressional oversight 
inquiry—by a select House committee investigating the circumstances of an 
attack that killed about 600 U.S. troops commanded by Maj. Gen. Arthur St. 
Clair, id. at 1190; the first joint House-Senate investigative panel, conducted 
from December 1861 through May 1865, that examined “past and future 
battle plans, disloyal employees, navy installations, and war supplies and 
contracts” (considered “the worst-run congressional inquiry until the 
McCarthy hearings of the 1950s”), id.; the Financial Trusts investigation 
from February 1912 to February 1913 by a House Banking and Currency 
subcommittee looking into “the concentration of money and credit, especially 
the control exercised by two New York banks,” with the “panel’s report 
help[ing] [the] enactment of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913” among other 
legislation; id.; the investigations by the Senate Subcommittee on Public 
Lands and Surveys and the Senate Select Committee to Investigate the 
Justice Department, during 1923-24, into the “lease of naval oil reserves, 
including one called Teapot Dome under a Wyoming rock formation by the 
Harding Administration,” id. at 1190-91; the Defense Programs inquiry by 
the Special Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, 
during March 1941 to April 1948 (viewed as “the most effective congressional 
investigation ever”) into “the status of national defenses to a more specific 
review of war mobilization problems, shortages of critical materials such as 
aluminum, and fraud among contractors and lobbyists,” id. at 1191; the 
Kefauver Crime Hearings, from May 1950 to Summer 1951, being the Senate 
Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, 
which was “the first congressional hearings to draw the rapt attention of 
television viewers across the nation as prominent gangsters and underworld 
leaders were paraded in front of the panel,” id.; the McCarthy Investigations, 
from January 1953 to December 1954, as the Senate Government Operations 
Committee’s Permanent Investigations Committee conducted “a sweeping 
array of probes of purported communist subversion of the U.S. government 
and the United Nations,” id. at 1191-92; the Watergate Hearings, during 
January 1973 to July 1974 of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities and the House Judiciary Committee’s impeachment 
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oversight skills” and inclination to investigate executive 
operations.256  Possible causes for this diminished effectiveness of 
congressional oversight include the packed schedules and shorter 
workweeks of Senators and Members of Congress, term limits on 
chairmanships of congressional committees, less funds for 
investigative staff, the hard-work and low-payoff of traditional 
oversight by legislators, the higher priority given by legislators to 
constituent services and legislative work, and political-pressure to 
go easy on the executive branch during a time of same-party 
control of Congress and the White House since George W. Bush 
became President in January 2001.257
With regard to the combined Senate-House Joint Inquiry into 
the September 11 terrorist attacks, knowledgeable observers 
contend that Congress has been “outperformed” by the National 
Commission on terrorist attacks.258  One commentator has 
concluded that the independent commission, turned over to 
commissioners outside of Congress: “has pried more disclosures 
about the 2001 terrorist attacks” than the congressional Joint 
Inquiry and “generated enough public pressure to force national 
security advisor Condoleeza Rice to testify publicly, and Bush and 
Vice President Dick Cheney to brief the panel in private—all 
witnesses that the congressional” Joint Inquiry “never heard 
from.”259  Another observer, commenting on the seventeen 
preliminary staff reports written by the independent commission 
on 9/11, noted in implicit criticism to the congressional Joint 
Inquiry Report: 
In contrast to the plodding or self-promoting style of so 
many government documents, the staff reports of the 
commission investigating the September 11, 2001 attacks 
inquiry into President Richard M. Nixon’s illegal activities, id. at 1192; the 
Senate “Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to 
Intelligence Activities,” from January 1975 to April 1976, chaired by Senator 
Frank Church (D-Idaho), focusing on the CIA’s domestic spying activities 
during the Vietnam War and leading to the formation of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, id. at 1192-93; and the Iran Contra hearings, 
from November 1986 to August 1987, before the jointly-convened House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees, id. at 1193. 
 256. Id. at 1191. 
 257. Id. at 1191-94. 
 258. Id. at 1193. 
 259. Id. 
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have provided something truly rare in official 
Washington: a good read. 
In 17 crisply worded reports, the commission staff laid 
out facts from the events that shook and marred the lives 
of millions.  Using a style that is remarkably free of 
artifice, the authors achieved a high point in detail, 
clarity and coherence.260
C.  Improving Congressional Oversight of Counterterrorism 
The conventional wisdom is that because of the profound 
distrust between Republicans and Democrats in Congress there 
exists “political paralysis” to conduct effective congressional 
oversight of executive counterterrorism activities and to 
implement the type of structural changes needed to improve post-
September 11 national security.261  As this line of thinking goes, 
until the voters decide to create divided government between 
Congress and the Presidency, nothing much will happen to change 
the culture of counterterrorism policy in the CIA, the FBI, and the 
Pentagon.262  Perhaps this is correct.  But looking to the long-term, 
there are some institutional improvements that Congress should 
consider. 
1.  Consolidate Intelligence Functions 
“Jurisdiction over the various intelligence agencies and their 
budgets is currently divided among a number of committees” in 
both the House and the Senate.263  Keeping up on the oceanic flow 
of twentieth century counterterrorism policy requires focus.  “If 
lawmakers are going to try to consolidate the government’s 
intelligence gathering operations, as they should, they can set a 
good example by taking on the turf battles within their own ranks 
first.”264
 260. Christopher Marquis, Reports On Attacks Are Gripping, Not Dry, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2004, at A23. 
 261. See Helen Fessenden, Intelligence Panels’ Mission Corroded by Air of 
Distrust, 62 CONG. QUART. WKLY. 730 (Mar. 27, 2004). 
 262. Id. at 733. 
 263. Editorial, Wake Up the Watchdogs, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2004, at A26. 
 264. Id.  See also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 419-21 
(recommending consolidation of congressional oversight over 
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2.  Foster Intelligence Expertise 
Under current congressional rules, individual members of the 
intelligence committees “may serve only a prescribed term.”265  
This procedural restriction “was adopted in the 1970s to prevent 
lawmakers from being co-opted by the” executive branch’s 
intelligence agencies.266  In practice, however, members of the 
House and Senate are “driven from the committees just as they 
develop the necessary expertise to become . . .  good overseer[s] of 
the intelligence community.”267  As a related reform, the House 
and the Senate “should consider limiting the number of other 
positions that the leaders of the intelligence committees may hold 
to make sure that they have all the time needed for their 
responsibilities.”268
3.  Experiment with More Decentralized and Indirect Forms of 
Intervention 
While centralized statutory and budgetary changes in 
American executive branch intelligence activities and 
counterterrorism policies are appropriate (e.g., the recent 
congressional acquiescence to the JIR recommendations for a 
statutory change to create a new Director of National Intelligence, 
and the recommendation for a centralized all-source terrorism 
information fusion center (IFC)),269 innovative congressional 
initiatives that complement this fundamental restructuring are 
needed to make sure that the executive branch is vigorously 
following through on new counterterrorism reforms.  The 
intelligence committees of the House and the Senate should 
consider drawing upon the model of “destabilization rights” in 
public law litigation, articulated by Columbia Law professors 
Sabel and Simon, whereby plaintiffs earn judicial approval “to 
disentrench or unsettle a public institution when, first, it is failing 
to satisfy minimum standards of adequate performance and, 
second, it is substantially immune from conventional political 
counterterrorism and fostering expertise of specific members of Congress). 
 265. Editorial, supra note 263, at A26. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 268. Id.  See also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 419-21. 
 269. See supra notes 124-37 and accompanying text; infra note 304. 
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mechanisms of correction.”270
While counterterrorist institutional failures of key national 
security agencies of the executive branch of the federal 
government, like the FBI, CIA, and NSA, fitfully uncovered in the 
Joint Inquiry Report, are different from institutional failures of 
public schools, mental health facilities, prisons, police 
departments, and housing authorities, these differences are in 
degree, not in kind.271  Institution building, maintenance, repair, 
and improvement have been a recurrent theme of American law 
and democracy since Hart and Sacks articulated their vision of 
legal process philosophy in the 1950s.272  They noted, in this 
regard: 
[T]o help in seeing that the principle of institutional 
settlement operates not merely as a principle of necessity 
but as a principle of justice this means attention to the 
constant improvement of all of the procedures which 
depend upon the principle in the effort to assure that they 
yield decisions which are not merely preferable to the 
chaos of no decision but are calculated as well . . . to 
advance the larger purposes of society.273 
Indeed, Guido Calabresi has described the legal process school 
as primarily interested in “comparative institutional analysis,”274 
 270. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How 
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1062 (2004). 
 271. Cf. id. at 1021-53 (discussing the details of institutional breakdown 
in public schools, mental health facilities, prisons, police departments, and 
housing authorities). 
 272. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1-4 (10th 
ed. 1958) (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds. 1994) (theorizing 
that human conflict, in the satisfaction of human wants is an inescapable 
feature of human interdependence and in resolving this inherent and 
systemic conflict “affirmative and knowledgeable cooperation” through law is 
necessary.  Moreover, Hart and Sacks recognized that as part of their 
fundamental interdependence with others, “people form themselves into 
groups for the protection and advancement of their common interests”; so, 
too, individuals establish “[t]he [i]nstitutionalization of [p]rocedures for the 
[s]ettlement of [q]uestions of [g]roup [c]oncern”). 
 273. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 274. Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches 
to Law and to the Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2113 
(2003). 
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with new legal process theorists of the Columbia School, like Sabel 
and Simon, embracing “a spirit of Deweyen experimentalism by 
focusing on the development of new institutions”275 and 
institutional procedures. 
Just as courts in various types of public law litigation 
involving schools, prisons and the like have, with maturing 
experience, developed a general sense of the “inadequacy of 
command-and-control approaches”276 of highly prescriptive and 
detailed injunctive orders because they came to appreciate that 
“they lacked both the information and depth and range of control 
to properly formulate and enforce command-and-control 
injunctions”277 while “command-and-control interventions 
exacerbated resistance on the part of [institutional] defendants,”278 
so should the United States Congress and its intelligence 
committees develop a general sense of the inadequacy of top-down, 
command-and-control statutory and budgetary measures to alter 
the behavior of executive branch intelligence and counterterrorism 
agencies.  With the threat of imposing a “penalty of default”279 of 
fundamental restructuring of executive branch intelligence and 
counterterrorism executive branch agencies or appropriations 
riders, the intelligence committees of the House and the Senate 
should seek to experiment with three specific decentralized and 
indirect forms of congressional oversight borrowed from the Sabel-
Simon new legal process insights about recent trends in judicial 
supervision of public interest litigation. 
First, the intelligence committees of Congress should seek to 
spur “stakeholder negotiation”280 superintended by a special 
mediator, with appropriate security clearance appointed by the 
relevant congressional committee.  Conducted with the authority 
of an ongoing legislative oversight hearing, a congressional 
intelligence committee should mandate that all relevant 
stakeholders from the executive branch intelligence community 
 275. Id. at 2125 n.50 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 276. Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1053. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 1067.  For a general theoretical discussion of the challenges 
and tools available for the conscientious American legislator, see generally 
Robert F. Blomquist, The Good American Legislator: Some Legal Process 
Perspectives and Possibilities, 38 AKRON L. REV. 895 (2005). 
 280. Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1067. 
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deliberate with each other (most frequently in secret closed 
sessions) “face to face” and be required to “defend their positions 
with reasons.”281  Intelligence committee-imposed stakeholder 
negotiations should require participants “to listen to each other in 
good faith and to remain open to learning”282 and, “[t]o the extent 
that a [stakeholder’s] proposals rest on factual premises, the 
[stakeholder] must make available relevant information within 
her control”283 without the excessive security blocks on sensitive 
information that has characterized past executive branch 
responses to congressional inquiries.  The goal of these 
stakeholder negotiations under congressional oversight 
imprimatur should be consensus, to be achieved through 
“openness”284 and “mutual respect”285 within the confines of the 
(often secret) negotiations.  The intelligence committees of 
Congress should strive to groom one or more of its members to 
develop the role as mediator between executive branch agencies 
because of the power and prestige this legislator would enjoy.  
However, a professional, non-legislative 
intelligence/counterterrorism mediator, under the control of the 
relevant congressional intelligence committees, might prove to be 
useful as well. 
Second, the intelligence committees of Congress should seek 
to instigate a “rolling-rule regime”286 where the norms of 
counterterrorism policy emerging from stakeholder negotiations 
with executive branch officials are “provisional,”287 “incorporate a 
process of reassessment and revision with continuing stakeholder 
participation.”288  Stakeholders would be urged by the 
congressional oversight mediators to develop “performance 
measures that are as specific as possible,”289 leaving to executive 
branch intelligence and counterterrorism agency officials 
“substantial discretion,”290 subject, however, to “precise targets.”291  
 281. Id. at 1068. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1068. 
 286. Id. at 1069 (footnote omitted). 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1069. 
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In addition, “some processes, most often including documentation 
and reporting, will be specified in detail.”292  With continuous 
feedback by the congressional mediators, the intelligence 
committees of Congress should develop interim oversight reports 
which include “general descriptions of the 
[intelligence/counterterrorism stakeholders’] goals, prescriptions 
for measuring their progress toward them, and commitments to 
make information available.”293  Moreover, these congressional 
interim intelligence oversight reports might also include “a variety 
of other norms that set out, perhaps in great detail, practices or 
operations procedures”294 of executive branch agencies. 
Third, the intelligence committees of Congress should try to 
attain “transparency”295 in the executive branch intelligence and 
counterterrorism operations, which, at a minimum, insists that 
“the policies and operating norms of the rolling-rule regimes must 
be explicit”296 and publicly declared to Congress (subject to 
reasonable national security blocks to public access).  
Transparency should be “both an accountability norm and a 
learning device,”297 which is “intended in part to facilitate 
practices of disciplined comparison.”298  Congress, when armed 
with these comparative metrics—which might include private 
sector assessments of performance of counterterrorism 
measures299—could reward those executive branch agencies which 
 291. Id. at 1070. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 1071. 
 294. Id.  According to Professors Sabel and Simon: 
[W]hatever the technical legal status of the plans, their function is 
not so much to coerce obedience as to introduce internal deliberation 
and external transparency.  Forcing the [stakeholders] . . . to agree 
on a clear description of their practices puts pressure on them to 
reflect on and explain what they are doing.  Moreover, the practice 
norms enable outsiders to determine what the practitioners are up 
to.  They complement the performance norms by describing the 
inputs that generate the outputs indicated by those norms. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 295. Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1071. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at 1072. 
 298. Id. 
 299. As an excellent model for private sector input into sensitive national 
security matters, see NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2015: 
A DIALOGUE ABOUT THE FUTURE WITH NONGOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS NIC 2000-
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achieve good performance with autonomy and recommendations 
for requested funding.300  “As for poor performance, the trick” for 
Congress would be “to balance remedial support, loss of control, 
and outright punishment” of deficient executive branch actions.301  
But legislative oversight “[e]xperimentalism does not provide 
determinate guidance on the question of sanctions.  It pins hopes 
largely on the effects of transparency”302 with a context of national 
security secretism.  “By exposing poor performance as clearly as 
possible, it opens the system to general scrutiny and exposes it 
more readily”303 to congressional intervention. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Joint Inquiry conducted by the intelligence committees of 
Congress to ascertain the causes of executive branch failures to 
anticipate and possibly prevent the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001 was deeply flawed.  Hobbled by secretism and obstruction 
by the executive branch, including the lack of cooperation by the 
President and Vice President, divided by partisan bickering 
within Congress, distracted by misguided public hearings and 
accompanying political grandstanding, and weakened by poor 
leadership of the Senate and House intelligence committees, the 
Joint Inquiry and its work product, the Joint Inquiry Report, 
suffered a lack of credibility.  Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the 
Joint Inquiry on 9/11 can be understood as part of a steady erosion 
in recent decades of the art of congressional oversight of the 
executive branch of the federal government. 
Congress could help to rectify its lackluster performance of 
executive branch oversight, in general, and improve its oversight 
of executive agency counterterrorism performance, in particular, 
by considering three pragmatic internal congressional reforms304: 
02 (Dec. 2000) (discussing, among other “drivers and trends,” the 
development of “transnational terrorism” and possible American responses). 
 300. Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1072. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 1073. 
 303. Id. 
 304. The danger of these proposed reforms is that they will end up being 
more process than real congressional oversight of executive branch 
counterterrorism policy.  Cf. Orde F. Kittrie, More Process Than Peace: 
Legitimacy, Compliance, and the Oslo Accords, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1661, 1663 
(2003) (book review) (the reliance of the drafters of the Oslo Accords relied to 
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(1) consolidating intelligence review functions into the intelligence 
committees; (2) fostering intelligence expertise of Senate and 
House intelligence committee members; and (3) experimenting 
with more decentralized and indirect forms of intervention by 
creating intelligence mediators who would be responsible to 
Congress and who would seek to spur (a) stakeholder negotiation, 
(b) a rolling rule regime of norms for counterterrorism 
performance and practice, and (c) transparency in executive 
branch intelligence and counterterrorism operations, subject to 
reasonable secrecy required by legitimate national security 
considerations. 
 
an excessive degree “on open-ended gradualism and ambiguity in their efforts 
to turn peace negotiations into a legally binding, final settlement” which 
“reliance proved to be disastrously counterproductive”).  For the rather tepid 
suggestions by the 9/11 Commission to improve congressional oversight of 
intelligence and homeland security, see THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra 
note 8, at 419-21. 
  For interesting recent articles discussing the constitutional 
dimensions of the post-9/11 terrorism environment—beyond the scope of this 
Article—see generally Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to 
Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); Bruce 
Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004). 
  For an account of congressional bills to incorporate the 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT’s recommendations into legislation, see Philip Shenon, 
Bipartisan Bill Offered on 9/11 Panel’s Proposals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004, 
at A1.  See also Editorial, Duty Chafes on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 
2004, at A26 (“The bipartisan Report’s parallel warning that Congress must 
reform itself to apply true intelligence oversight is flat-lining so far on Capitol 
Hill as rival committee leaders defend a checkerboard full of important 
fiefs.”). 
  Congress, in late 2004, with prodding by President Bush, ended up 
passing legislation that encapsulated many of the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommendations—some of which had also been suggested by the 
congressional Joint Inquiry.  Perhaps the most significant change in the 
intelligence law reforms was the creation of the position of National 
Intelligence Director.  See Intelligence, 63 CONG. QUART. WKLY. 24 (Jan. 3, 
2005)  
The first homeland security question to be resolved is whether the 
House will create a more powerful committee to oversee 
[intelligence] or continue to fragment oversight among dozens of 
panels. . . . Congress passed the intelligence overhaul bill, but now 
the Intelligence and Homeland Security committees will have to deal 
with what they wrought, overseeing yet another major government 
reorganization. 
Id. 
